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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Are we better off shielding ourselves from epistemological doubt?  If 
so, should courts and legislatures construe religious free exercise rights 
so as to enable religious adherents to preserve their salutary 
dogmatism?1  A burgeoning literature on the nexus between religious 
doubt and happiness suggests that religious certainty conduces to 
psychological well-being.2  This literature has arisen from a larger effort 
to comprehend the relationship between religion and happiness more 
                                                 
* Eric Apar earned a Juris Doctor from the Georgetown University Law Center in May 
2014. 
1 See infra Part VII (discussing the U.S. Supreme Court’s free exercise jurisprudence). 
2 See infra Part III.B (discussing the relationship between religious certainty and 
happiness). 
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generally—an effort that has yielded a welter of divergent themes and 
findings.3 
The objective of this analysis is two-fold:  first, to distill these 
disparate threads into coherent, meaningful insights; and second, to 
gesture toward the implications of these insights for free exercise rights.  
To begin, this Article sketches the psychology of religion and 
epistemology generally before moving to an examination of the 
psychological and sociological literature on the religion-happiness nexus 
in particular.  With few dissenting voices, this literature offers 
compelling evidence that religion promotes various measures of mental 
well-being.4 
I will then proceed to the crux of this analysis.  The empirical 
literature reveals that the religion-happiness connection may owe not to 
religion itself, but rather to the salutary influence of epistemological 
certainty.5  This finding clashes with the distaste for dogmatic certainty 
that prevails among the learned classes, and with the concomitant 
embrace of creeds that tolerate or even encourage doubt and self-
scrutiny.6  It should bring disquiet to those who exalt the elastic religion 
of the mainstream and condemn the unyielding faith of the true believer.  
Finally, this Article questions whether the U.S. Supreme Court’s free 
exercise jurisprudence imperils epistemological certainty and the 
psychological benefits that accompany it.7 
The political, legal, and social implications of the religion-happiness 
connection are far-reaching.  From the living room to the courts, from 
classrooms and houses of worship to legislatures and government 
                                                 
3 See infra Part III (explaining the nexus between religion and psychological well-being). 
4 See infra Part III (examining the positive relationship between religion and well-being). 
5 See infra Part III.B (discussing the role of certainty in the connection between well-
being and religion). 
6 See BRYAN WILSON, RELIGION IN SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 174 (1982) (“Today, 
religious perceptions share an uneasy and shrinking frontier with rational precepts”); 
Philip Schwadel, The Effects of Education on Americans’ Religious Practices, Beliefs, and 
Affiliations, 53 REV. RELIGIOUS RES. 161, 164 (2011) (examining the capacity of higher 
education to undermine religious certainty).  One scholar states: 
The emphasis on alternative viewpoints in higher education works 
against the exclusivist assumption that one theistic system is superior 
to other theistic systems.  The belief that one religion is exclusively true 
is contrary to the recognition of disparate perspectives and the 
diversity of social networks associated with higher levels of education.  
Put another way, highly educated Americans with diverse social 
networks are relatively unlikely to emphasize that their friends’ and 
associates’ beliefs are patently false. 
Id. 
7 See infra Part VII (discussing the potential impact of the U.S. Supreme Court’s free 
exercise jurisprudence on epistemological certainty). 
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agencies, we find ourselves compelled either to respect or to breach the 
walls that individuals, families, and communities build around their 
faiths.  Whether dissonance and doubt manage to penetrate these 
defenses is a matter not only for parents and teachers, but for courts and 
legislatures as well.  As I will attempt to show, how carefully we guard 
epistemological certainty—or, alternatively, how enthusiastically we 
embrace cognitive dissonance as a vessel for truth seeking and personal 
growth—may substantially influence the happiness of those whose 
certainty is at stake. 
The purpose of this analysis is not to challenge the wisdom of our 
educational system’s commitment to critical reflection or the Supreme 
Court’s free exercise jurisprudence.  Doubt has many virtues and 
certainty many perils.  Epistemological flexibility encourages 
interpersonal understanding and amity.8  It exposes one to humanity’s 
rich and variegated character, and it can be vital to personal growth.9  
This Article is not advocating that we persist in error to preserve 
epistemological order.  It is merely urging that we consider the costs of 
psychic dissonance, and that we not allow our zeal for spiritual 
introspection to obscure the toll that religious doubt can exact. 
II.  KEEPING ORDER AND ALLAYING FEAR:  THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION 
To place the literature on religion and happiness in its proper 
context, we first must understand the psychology of religion and belief 
more generally.  The dominant currents in the literature on the 
psychology of belief share a common theme:  human beings try mightily 
to avoid psychic discord and to construct coherent, orderly systems for 
interpreting phenomena.10  Doubt and confusion invade these systems 
like pathogens, creating dislocation and instability.11  Put simply, 
humans seek to keep their epistemological houses in order.  
Epistemological certainty is a natural—indeed, even an evolutionarily 
advantageous—condition, a North Star in tempestuous waters. 
Yet our universities and graduate schools boast of their capacity to 
remove students from their comfort zones, to foster critical reflection on 
even the most cherished orthodoxies.12  As this Article addresses below, 
                                                 
8 See infra Part V (discussing the relationship between faith and doubt). 
9 See infra Part V (examining the benefits of doubt to personal growth). 
10 See infra Part II (analyzing theories regarding the relationship between religion and 
mental well-being). 
11 See infra Part III (discussing the negative impact of doubt on well-being). 
12 Rebecca Alpert, Force Students to Challenge Their Beliefs, TEMPLE NEWS (Dec. 3, 2013), 
http://temple-news.com/opinion/op-ed-force-students-challenge-beliefs/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/5L7A-Q5G6; see Charlene P.E. Burns, Cognitive Dissonance Theory and the 
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the Supreme Court’s move away from vigorous enforcement of the Free 
Exercise Clause of the U.S. Constitution has weakened a potent weapon 
against epistemological doubt—the constitutional right of religious 
individuals and communities to act consistently with their convictions 
and to insulate themselves from sources of dissonance, even in the face 
of an otherwise binding legal obligation.13 
A. Attachment, ETAS, and HADD Theories 
Attachment theory and Evolutionary Threat Assessment Systems 
theory (“ETAS”) proceed from the same basic insight—that human 
beings are fundamentally insecure creatures that think and behave so as 
to minimize their vulnerability to the vagaries of the external world.14  
According to attachment theory, belief in a deity emerges from the same 
impulse that induces a child to latch onto its mother.15  Just as a child 
seeks the stability of a parent-caretaker, an anchor in an unstable world, 
so too does the religious devotee seek refuge in the bond she develops 
with a deity.16  A complex neurological machinery underpins the 
formation of this bond.17  A strong attachment to God, the theory holds, 
conduces to psychological welfare; a weak connection leaves one 
exposed to psychological pathology, anxiety, and feelings of insecurity.18 
                                                                                                             
Induced-Compliance Paradigm:  Concerns for Teaching Religious Studies, 9 TEACHING THEOLOGY 
& RELIGION 3, 5 (2006) (“[T]he liberal arts educational process itself trades on the power of 
cognitive dissonance to enhance learning . . . ”). 
13 See infra Part VII (discussing the potential impact of the U.S. Supreme Court’s free 
exercise jurisprudence on epistemological certainty). 
14 See Kevin J. Flannelly & Kathleen Galek, Religion, Evolution, and Mental Health:  
Attachment Theory and ETAS Theory, 49 J. RELIGION & HEALTH 337, 342 (2010) (stating that 
“the application of Attachment Theory to religion follows logically from the notion that 
religion provides security in a world of uncertainty” (citation omitted)). 
15 See Lee A. Kirkpatrick & Philip R. Shaver, An Attachment-Theoretical Approach to 
Romantic Love and Religious Belief, 18 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 266, 267 (1992) 
(“Much like an infant’s primary caregiver, God may serve as a secure base and as a haven 
of safety and comfort for believers”). 
16 See Christopher G. Ellison, Religious Involvement and Subjective Well-Being, 32 J. HEALTH 
& SOC. BEHAV. 80, 81 (1991) [hereinafter Ellison, Religious Involvement] (“[D]ivine interaction 
may enhance perceived well-being by deepening the sense of orderliness and predictability 
of events and by investing problematic situations with new religious meanings.”). 
17 See Flannelly & Galek, supra note 14, at 337–38 (“Evolutionary Threat Assessment 
Systems Theory (ETAS Theory), proposes that religious and other kinds of beliefs directly 
affect psychiatric symptomology via specific neural networks in the brain.” (citation 
omitted)). 
18 See Rodney Stark & Jared Maier, Faith and Happiness, 50 REV. RELIGIOUS RES. 120, 123 
(2008) (“People who feel extremely close to God are nearly twice as likely to be very happy 
as are those who do not feel near to God.”); Flannelly & Galek, supra note 14, at 342 
(finding that “having a secure attachment with God appears to be associated with 
psychological well-being”).  “[I]ndividuals who had a secure attachment to God were more 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 49, No. 1 [2015], Art. 11
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Where attachment theorists postulate a human impulse to forge 
bonds with God, ETAS theorists maintain that religious convictions arise 
from a basic human drive, hard-wired into our neurochemistry, to 
neutralize external threats.19  Here, the evolutionary advantage derives 
not from a strong attachment to a divine being, but from religion’s 
capacity to defuse threats to human welfare.20  The distinction here is 
subtle, for both theories rest on a fundamental desire for stability amid 
chaos.  But where attachment theory does not speak to the substance of 
the divine anchor that religion provides, ETAS theorists argue that 
religion’s evolutionary advantage requires that the adherent hold a 
sanguine conception of God.21  Under ETAS theory, a vindictive God, 
however stable, does nothing to counterbalance the threats to human 
well-being that lurk in the external environment—to the contrary, it 
compounds them.22  A loving God offers not only stability, as under 
attachment theory, but safety as well.23  Buoyed by the belief that a 
                                                                                                             
satisfied with life and less lonely than individuals who had an insecure attachment to 
God. . . .  [S]ecure attachment [is] related to lower anxiety, and . . . insecure attachment 
to . . .  higher anxiety and negative affect.”  Id. (citations omitted); see also Christopher G. 
Ellison et al., Religious Resources, Spiritual Struggles, and Mental Health in a Nationwide Sample 
of PCUSA Clergy, 59 PASTORAL PSYCHOL. 287, 289–90 (2010) [hereinafter Ellison, Religious 
Resources] (“Struggles in one’s relationship with the divine are associated with a range of 
mental health outcomes, such as elevated rates of anxiety . . . depression and suicidality.” 
(citations omitted)). 
19 See Flannelly & Galek, supra note 14, at 345 (“[C]ertain beliefs about God and life-after-
death reduce ETAS assessments about the dangerousness of the world and . . .  this directly 
reduces psychiatric symptoms.”). 
20 See David H. Rosmarin, Kenneth I. Pargament & Annette Mahoney, The Role of 
Religiousness in Anxiety, Depression, and Happiness in a Jewish Community Sample:  A 
Preliminary Investigation, 12 MENTAL HEALTH, RELIGION & CULTURE 97, 108 (2009) (“[T]rust 
and mistrust in God were significant predictors of anxiety, depression, and happiness.  
Trust in God . . . may engender positive cognitions about the future, leading to decreases in 
hopelessness and depression and increases in happiness.”). 
21 See id. at 100 (considering the ways in which trust in God reduces anxiety).  Some 
scholars maintain that: 
[T]rust in God may reduce negative appraisals of perceived danger.  
After all, if one believes that God knows everything, has the power to 
take care of any situation, and is merciful, generous, and righteous, 
there would seem to be less to be afraid of.  Furthermore, while 
intolerance to uncontrollability and unpredictability has been posited 
to play a central role in human anxiety, the importance of these 
cognitive factors may be undermined by the belief that God is merciful 
and generous . . . . 
Id. (citation omitted). 
22 See Flannelly & Galek, supra note 14, at 345 (“[P]leasant beliefs about life-after-death 
were all associated with lower levels of psychiatric symptoms, while unpleasant afterlife 
beliefs were associated with higher levels of symptoms among normal adults.”). 
23 See id. at 344–45 (describing the relationship between religious security and 
psychiatric disorders). 
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beneficent overseer superintends their surroundings, human beings can 
venture into a hazardous world in relative peace.24 
According to the Hyperactive Agency Detection Device (“HADD”) 
hypothesis, belief in God derives from our innate desire to ascribe 
phenomena to an intelligent agent whose actions are comprehensible.25  
The human psyche rebels against arbitrariness and instability.26  Its 
natural condition is to discern a knowing actor responsible for the 
stewardship of an orderly universe.27  Together, these theories testify to a 
common principle:  man is essentially a scared and fragile creature, 
grasping for order in a tumultuous world.  Religion—at least when it 
confers on its practitioners a feeling of comfort and safety—helps allay 
this condition.28  It is both natural and evolutionarily advantageous.29  It 
empowers man to function in a dangerous world and to cope with the 
vicissitudes and uncertainties of existence.30  But it serves this function 
only insofar as it offers a genuine refuge from those vicissitudes.  If 
religion is yet another uncertainty in a precarious world, man remains 
rudderless.31 
                                                 
24 See id. at 342–45 (finding that a secure attachment engenders feelings of safety in 
threatening circumstances). 
25 See Joshua C. Thurow, Does Cognitive Science Show Belief in God to be Irrational? The 
Epistemic Consequences of the Cognitive Science of Religion, 74 INT. J. PHILOS. & RELIGION 77, 
80–81 (2013) (“Humans possess . . . a hypersensitive agency detection device—HADD.  In 
virtue of HADD, people seem to have a strong bias to interpret ambiguous evidence as 
caused by . . . an agent.” (citations omitted)). 
26 See id. at 81 (discussing the tendency to seek explanations for events and suggesting 
“that god concepts are minimally counterintuitive”). 
27 See JUSTIN L. BARRETT, WHY WOULD ANYONE BELIEVE IN GOD? 31 (2004) (maintaining 
that belief in God is a natural phenomenon arising from cognitive tools possessed by every 
human being). 
28 See Ellison, Religious Involvement, supra note 16, at 82 (“There is mounting evidence 
that persons who enjoy a greater sense of coherence and order in their lives also have better 
physical and psychological health than others.  [R]esearchers frequently have suggested 
that strong religious beliefs and experiences may deepen this sense of meaning and 
comprehensibility.” (citations omitted)). 
29 Ed Diener et al., The Religion Paradox:  If Religion Makes People Happy, Why Are So Many 
Dropping Out?, 101 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1278, 1279 (2011) (“[E]volutionary 
analysts [argue that] religion is nearly universal because it serves adaptive purposes.  The 
supporters of religion argue that by fostering morality, social cohesion, and group survival, 
religion may aid coping.”). 
30 See Jan Eichhorn, Happiness for Believers?  Contextualizing the Effects of Religiosity on Life-
Satisfaction, 28 EUR. SOC. REV. 583, 584–85 (2012) (analyzing the influence of religiosity on 
life satisfaction in different countries). 
31 See Christopher G. Ellison et al., Religious Doubts and Sleep Quality:  Findings from a 
Nationwide Study of Presbyterians, 53 REV. RELIGIOUS RES. 119, 123 (2011) [hereinafter Ellison 
et al., Religious Doubt] (“[B]ecause religious faith provides a sense of meaning and 
purpose . . . unresolved religious doubts may signal an existential crisis.  Individuals 
dealing with this uncertainty . . . may feel restless and worried, and may find it more 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 49, No. 1 [2015], Art. 11
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B. Terror Management Theory 
Under terror management theory, systems of meaning and belief 
develop in response to humans’ innate terror of death and from the 
transience of human life.32  Coherent systems of meaning and belief offer 
stability and permanence in the face of human mortality.33  Religion 
serves three purposes here.  First, religion responds directly to our dread 
of death by doing away with mortality altogether.34  Belief in an afterlife 
allays our fear of death by converting the specter of expiration into a 
mere transitional moment—though, as with ETAS theory, the benefit 
here depends on the belief that one is transitioning to a happier place, a 
wrinkle to which this Article will return later.35  Second, religion imbues 
its adherents with purpose and direction—it militates against the 
depressing conclusion that life is not only tragically fleeting, but 
                                                                                                             
difficult to deal with the demands of daily life and personal problems.”).  “The negative 
thoughts and ruminations over this form of spiritual strain . . . may give rise to feelings of 
psychological distress . . . [and] may in turn trigger the release of stress hormones [] that 
promote mental and physiological arousal.”  Id. (citations omitted). 
32 See R. David Hayward & Marta Elliott, Fitting in with the Flock:  Social Attractiveness as a 
Mechanism for Well-Being in Religious Groups, 39 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 592, 593 (2009) 
(examining the importance of specific aspects of religious beliefs).  These scholars explain: 
There is theoretical support from the Terror Management perspective 
that rather than the specific contents of religious beliefs, it is the 
capacity for religious faith to provide a sense of existential certainty 
that is most important in promoting well-being.  While this aspect of 
religion has been directly measured less frequently than others, it has 
some empirical support. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
33 See Gareth J. Morris & Tina McAdie, Are Personality, Well-Being and Death Anxiety 
Related to Religious Affiliation?, 12 MENTAL HEALTH, RELIGION & CULTURE 115, 116 (2009) 
(“[S]tudies have found strong religious conviction to be associated with lower death 
anxiety.” (citations omitted)). 
34 See Samuel R. Weber et al., Psychological Distress Among Religious Nonbelievers:  A 
Systematic Review, 51 J. REL. HEALTH 72, 80 (2012) (“In a Swedish study, atheists and 
agnostics scored higher on the Death Depression Scale . . . than did believers, indicating 
greater death anxiety in the non-believing groups.”). 
35 Id.; see also Morris & McAdie, supra note 33, at 119 (discussing Greenberg’s Terror 
Management Theory).  Greenberg found as follows: 
Terror Management Theory as Christians scored lower for death 
anxiety than the non-religious participants.  However, as Muslims 
scored significantly higher than the non-religious, this refutes TMT.  It 
appears as though for Muslims, belief in the afterlife does not serve to 
reduce anxiety about death. It can be understood through the 
individual responses of the Christians in the questionnaire how TMT 
functions.  Themes of heaven and eternal life are prevalent, whereas 
for Muslims the afterlife may be something to fear . . . 
Id. 
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meaningless as well.36  Third, religion breeds attachment to values and 
principles that transcend the ephemeral material world.37  The stability 
and permanence of these values counterbalance the essential instability 
and impermanence of human existence.  While flesh and blood may 
perish, our ideals persist.  Belief helps us fashion an enduring legacy in 
the face of our mortality.38 
These last two functions are not exclusive to religion.  Strong 
conviction, whether religious or secular, can confer meaning, purpose, 
and a feeling of permanence.  Our terror of death motivates us to repel 
                                                 
36 See Christopher G. Ellison et al., Does Religious Commitment Contribute to Individual Life 
Satisfaction?, 68 SOC. FORCES 100, 102 (1989) [hereinafter Ellison et al., Does Religious 
Commitment Contribute] (“After holding constant the influence of background 
variables . . . only religious salience was a useful predictor of a sense of the ‘meaning’ and 
‘purpose’ of life.”). 
37 Abram Rosenblatt et al., Evidence for Terror Management Theory:  I.  The Effects of 
Mortality Salience on Reactions to Those Who Violate or Uphold Cultural Values, 57 J.  
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 681, 681 (1989).  See Jeff Greenberg et al., Evidence for Terror 
Management Theory II:  The Effects of Mortality Salience on Reactions to Those Who Threaten or 
Bolster the Cultural Worldview, 58 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 308, 308 (1990) 
[hereinafter Theory II] (“Although there is great variability in the contents of the 
worldviews associated with any given culture, all such conceptions provide the universe 
with order, meaning, value, and the possibility of either literal or symbolic immortality.”). 
38 See Rosenblatt et al., supra note 37, at 689 (demonstrating the important role morals 
play in shaping cultural standards).  Rosenblatt explains: 
[M]oral principles are part of the more general set of cultural standards 
against which people compare themselves to assess their value.  Thus, 
moral principles facilitate the individual’s efforts to conceive of him- or 
herself as a valued contributor to something meaningful and 
permanent (the culture). . . . [T]he cultural anxiety-buffer allows 
continual repression of our existential terror. . . . Although the terror 
may on occasion rise to consciousness in muted form, most of the 
anxiety people experience results from threats to either the worldview 
or self-esteem components of the cultural anxiety-buffer that protects 
them from underlying existential terror. 
Id. (citation omitted).  Theory II states: 
[F]rom a terror management perspective, one very important function 
of culture . . . is to provide a means of conceptualizing reality that 
allows for the possibility of equanimity in the face of human 
vulnerability and mortality.  Put simply, people’s beliefs about reality 
provide a buffer against the anxiety that results from living in a largely 
uncontrollable, perilous universe, where the only certainty is death. 
Theory II, supra note 37, at 308.  “Christians with a strong religious conviction scored lower 
for death anxiety than non-religious participants. . . . [B]elief in the afterlife is associated 
with lower death anxiety.”  Morris & McAdie, supra note 33, at 118.  “Witter and associates 
suggest that religiosity may facilitate . . . ‘achieving enduring significance beyond one’s 
physical self and life.’”  Ellison et al., Does Religious Commitment Contribute, supra note 36, at 
103 (citations omitted); see also Robert A. Witter et al., Religion and Subjective Well-Being in 
Adulthood:  A Quantitative Synthesis, 26 REV. RELIGIOUS RES. 332, 332 (1985) (noting the link 
between “achieving enduring significance beyond one’s physical self and life” and “inner 
contentment.”). 
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threats not only to our religious conceptions, but also to our cultural and 
political values.39  Researchers have found that heightened mortality 
awareness diminishes tolerance of heterodoxy and magnifies the desire 
to reinforce norms.40  After responding to a questionnaire designed to 
raise mortality awareness, judges doled out harsher penalties for 
hypothetical defendants whose behavior challenged social norms.41  
Moreover, study participants reported stronger animus toward members 
of other religious denominations after experimenters made mortality 
salient.42  They also recorded amplified hostility toward those who 
questioned—and a greater affinity for those who praised—their cultural 
worldviews.43 
Our terror of death and our beliefs, religious or otherwise, appear to 
be interwoven.  To the extent that religion kindles an unusually powerful 
sense of meaning and permanence—and inasmuch as it simply 
eliminates mortality entirely—it is uniquely adroit at managing our fear 
of death.44  But the purpose of this discussion is not to distinguish 
                                                 
39 See Rosenblatt et al., supra note 37, at 688 (examining reactions to deviations from an 
individual’s cultural worldview).  Terror management theory is described as follows: 
According to terror management theory, the beliefs and values that 
make up an individual’s cultural worldview serve the vital function of 
buffering the anxiety that results from awareness of human 
vulnerability and mortality.  The theory posits that the cultural 
worldview espoused by any given individual is a fragile construction 
that needs persistent social validation . . . Those who deviate from 
cultural standards are responded to with disdain because such 
behavior threatens the values that underlie the individual’s source of 
security.  Similarly, those who uphold cultural values are admired 
because such behavior validates the individual’s values. 
Id.; see also Theory II, supra note 37, at 309 (“Cultural worldviews are structured so that 
protection from negative outcomes and a sense of immortality depend on fulfilling the 
cultural requirements for being valued.”). 
40 See Rosenblatt et al., supra note 37, at 688 (“[T]he six studies reported in this article 
provide consistent support for terror management theory . . . . The present finding that 
reminding subjects of their mortality intensifies such reactions supports the proposition 
that the cultural worldview serves to protect individuals from anxiety concerning death.”); 
see also Theory II, supra note 37, at 309 (“[P]ositive reactions to similar others and negative 
reactions to dissimilar others occur partly because of the impact such individuals have on 
faith in one’s worldview.”). 
41 See Rosenblatt et al., supra note 37, at 688 (“[S]ubjects who were reminded of their 
mortality consistently recommended harsher treatment of a moral transgressor.”).  
42 See Theory II, supra note 37, at 318 (“Mortality salience appears to increase in-group 
favoritism, rejection of those who are different, and authoritarian tendencies.”). 
43 See id. (“This suggests that whenever events heighten mortality salience (e.g., 
newspaper accounts of catastrophes or violence in intergroup and interindividual 
conflicts), in-group solidarity, out-group derogation, nationalism, religious extremism, 
prejudice, discrimination, and intolerance of deviance are likely to escalate.”). 
44 See Neal Krause & Keith M. Wulff, Religious Doubt and Health:  Exploring the Potential 
Dark Side of Religion, 65 SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION 35, 39-40 (2004) (“[A] number of 
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religious from secular conviction.  Rather, it is to illustrate the stakes 
involved in matters of belief, religion, or otherwise.  Terror management 
theory suggests that when the ideologue lashes out at her detractors, 
there is more than simple divergence of opinion at work.  Indeed, such 
outrage emerges as well from an effort to allay death anxiety. 
C. Cognitive Dissonance 
Cognitive dissonance theorists posit that the human mind seeks 
psychic harmony.  Human beings, the theory holds, will go to great 
lengths to convince themselves that their epistemologies are true, 
consistent, and consonant with their behavior.45  Perceived incongruence 
among beliefs or between beliefs and behavior engenders painful 
discomfort that the mind seeks to quell.46  One might attempt to reason 
one’s way out of the tension, manipulating logic to bring discordant 
beliefs or behaviors into concordance.47  One might claim a lack of 
volition.  Indeed, evidence suggests that we feel more comfortable 
embracing dissonance-inducing behaviors or beliefs when doing so is 
necessary to receive a particularly enticing reward or to avoid an 
                                                                                                             
investigators maintain that one of the primary functions of religion is to provide a sense of 
meaning in life.” (citation omitted)).  “[I]dentity theory suggests that religious doubt may 
be pernicious primarily because it deprives a person of one of the most fundamental 
benefits of religion—a sense of meaning in life.”  Id.  “[P]roblems associated with roles that 
are valued highly have a more noxious effect on health and well-being than difficulties that 
arise in roles that are not as important.”  Id. at 40 (citation omitted).  “[I]t follows that if 
religion is valued highly, and doubts about religion arise, then subsequent feelings of 
cognitive dissonance should be especially troublesome.”  Id. 
45 See generally LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE 3–4, 10–11 (1957) 
(discussing the theory of cognitive dissonance and its effects on human psychology). 
46 See Burns, supra note 12, at 4 (explaining situations that lead to the “Hypocrisy 
Effect”).  Burns elaborates: 
When situations reveal an inconsistency between ideas to which one 
has personal commitment and [one’s] actual behavior, dissonance 
tends to be very high and the need to reduce it is strong.  When the 
beliefs are personally important, being placed in a position that makes 
it clear that one is not practicing what she preaches can be perceived as a 
threat to one’s self-image. 
Id.  “Cognitive dissonance indeed appears to cause an arousing and negative affective 
state. . . .  Moreover, the negative affect evoked by dissonance motivates dissonance 
reduction . . . ”  Christopher T. Burris, Eddie Harmon-Jones & W. Ryan Tarpley, “By Faith 
Alone”:  Religious Agitation and Cognitive Dissonance, 19 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 17, 
18 (1997) (citations omitted). 
47 See generally FESTINGER, supra note 45, at 31 (explaining how people rationalize 
behavior discordant with their beliefs); Burns, supra note 12, at 3-4 (elaborating on the 
discounting of dissonant ideas and the emphasizing of consonant ideas). 
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especially undesirable outcome.48  One might attack the credibility or 
motives of the source rather than engage the conflict substantively.49  
One might cling even more tightly to the challenged conviction, 
drowning out the tension.50  Finally, one might alter one’s behavior or 
beliefs in an effort to erase the contradiction and restore psychic 
harmony.51  However one escapes the discomfort, the implication is 
clear—our minds seek peace and eschew angst. 
Epistemological doubt is a species of cognitive dissonance.52  
Religious doubt in particular can be a singularly discombobulating 
experience, for religion often undergirds its adherents’ entire 
epistemology—remove the foundation, and the whole edifice collapses.53  
                                                 
48 See Burns, supra note 12, at 4 (“[W]hen a learner believes there is no choice, dissonance 
is nominal because the lack of choice is itself sufficient justification for compliance.” 
(citation omitted)).  “Despite their inability to practice plural marriage, [Mormons] could 
point to external coercion as justification for their behavior and thus minimize any 
dissonance they felt.  However, . . . [b]ecause the final push to conform came from within 
the Mormon community rather than from without, Mormons could no longer point to 
outside forces for this change in belief.”  Elizabeth Harmer-Dionne, Once a Peculiar People:  
Cognitive Dissonance and the Suppression of Mormon Polygamy as a Case Study Negating the 
Belief-Action Distinction, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1295, 1318 (1997–98) (footnote omitted). 
49 See Burns, supra note 12, at 4, 6 (discussing the “Hypocrisy Effect”). 
50 See id. at 4 (“In some instances, then, cognitive dissonance can actually intensify 
original attitudes.” (citation omitted)); see also Burris et al., supra note 46, at 24 (“More 
extreme profession of transcendent beliefs (God’s working as mysterious but benevolent, 
etc.) following exposure to a belief-threatening article was associated with reduced 
dissonance-related affect (both agitation and discomfort).”); Harmer-Dionne, supra note 48, 
at 1309 (“Contrary to ordinary expectations, external challenge and resistance may actually 
strengthen an adherent’s commitment to a particular religious creed.”). 
51 See Burns, supra note 12, at 4 (“Any dissonance that does arise can be reduced or 
eliminated by changing ones beliefs to make them more consonant with the induced 
behavior.”) (citation omitted). 
52 See Neal Krause, Religious Doubt and Psychological Well-Being:  A Longitudinal 
Investigation, 50 REV. OF RELIGIOUS RESEARCH, 94, 95–96 (2006) [hereinafter Krause, Religious 
Doubt and Psychological Well-Being] (“[R]eligious doubt may be viewed as an unsettling state 
of indecision that arises from seeing the validity of two seemingly inconsistent points of 
view. . . . Viewed in this way, doubt may be seen as a specific instance of the more general 
problem of cognitive dissonance.” (citation omitted)); see also Krause & Wulff, supra note 
44, at 36 (“Religious doubt is defined as, ‘ . . . a feeling of uncertainty toward, and a 
questioning of, religious teachings and beliefs.’” (citation omitted)). 
53 See Theta Gribbins & Brian Vandenberg, Religious Fundamentalism, the Need for 
Cognitive Closure, and Helping, 21 INT’L J. FOR THE PSYCHOL. OF RELIGION 106, 106–07 (2011) 
(analyzing religion’s role as a central system of beliefs).  Gribbins and Vandenberg explain: 
[Religious fundamentalism] differs from other fundamentalisms with 
rigidly held ideologies, such as market fundamentalism for example, 
in that it is an overarching belief system that regulates not only 
religious thoughts but all conceptions; it is in essence a ‘meta-belief’ or 
worldview.  This worldview provides an absolute foundation for 
determining what is and what should be, what is good and evil, and 
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To grow up in the embrace of a loving, omnipotent God, only to discover 
the ultimate rejoinder in the form of human suffering; to believe that one 
possesses the one Truth only to find that it is merely one among many—
such realizations not only discomfort the believer, they undermine the 
entire moral structure that derives from these convictions.54  The triggers 
of epistemological and religious doubt are ubiquitous.55  In a 
heterogeneous society, we constantly encounter reminders that our 
convictions are not universal, that others hold divergent views with 
equal ardor and confidence.56  When these societal cues alert us to the 
                                                                                                             
what is known and unknowable, which are conferred by an 
omniscient, omnipotent being. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
54 See id. (explaining the psychological effects or realization of such); see also Krause & 
Wulff, supra note 44, at 38 ([I]t may be difficult for a person to believe in a loving and 
protecting God, while at the same time recognizing there is a good deal of suffering, pain, 
and injustice in the world. Cognitive dissonance is especially important . . . because, as 
Festinger . . . argues, holding views that are incompatible can be a significant source of 
psychological distress.” (citation omitted)).  See generally Ellison et al., Religious Doubts, 
supra note 31, at 122 (considering the sources and consequences of religious reservations).  
These scholars believe that: 
Doubts or other nagging reservations about matters of faith can 
emerge from numerous sources, including the problem of evil, as 
believers struggle to understand why bad things happen, particularly 
to good people. Many persons also grapple with challenges posed by 
scientific developments, as well as a host of other issues concerning 
religious dogmas and institutional practices. . . . [A] growing body of 
evidence links unresolved doubts with a range of negative mental and 
physical health outcomes. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
55 See Krause, Religious Doubt and Psychological Well-Being, supra note 52, at 97 (“Doubts 
about religion are inevitable because the world is filled with seemingly contradictory 
evidence and experiences . . . [s]o the real issue is not the elimination of doubt. Instead, it 
involves how doubt is handled—how people respond to it.” (citation omitted)); see also 
Krause & Wulff, supra note 44, at 50 (“[B]elief systems are maintained primarily through 
commitment, and commitment is, in turn, dependent on validation. . . . It is simply not 
possible to verify that God exists, and the character, purposes, and will of God cannot be 
validated.  When validation is not possible, doubts may arise.”); Greenberg et al., supra 
note 37, at 309 (“Because the cultural anxiety-buffer is by its very nature a fragile social 
construction . . . it requires continual bolstering.” (citations omitted)).  “[P]eople are 
constantly reminded of their vulnerability and mortality; one need only pick up a 
newspaper or turn on a television news program to find examples of such reminders of the 
fragile nature of human existence.”  Id. 
56 See Simon Dein, Religious Doubts:  Implications for Psychopathology and Psychotherapy, 77 
BULLETIN OF THE MENNINGER CLINIC 201, 204 (2013) (“[F]ar more than in the past, believers 
must live their faith in a condition of doubt and uncertainty.  Today, religious 
faith . . . exists as but one possibility alongside a range of nonreligious worldviews. 
Pluralistic worldviews intensify the experience of doubt.”).  Theory II states: 
[T]he diverse array of beliefs and values that are encountered provide 
a reminder that one’s worldview may not be valid in any absolute 
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possibility that our beliefs are misguided, we experience profound 
disquiet—but the damage does not end there.  Such cues also undermine 
a primordial attachment to God (attachment theory), a threat-
neutralizing mechanism (ETAS theory), our desire to discern order in the 
universe (HADD theory), and our capacity to allay our terror of death 
(terror management theory).  Understanding these links between 
religion and psychology is vital to situating the empirical literature on 
religion and happiness in its proper context. 
III.  THE HAPPY FAITHFUL:  THE RELIGION-HAPPINESS NEXUS 
Recent decades have seen an explosion of research into the 
connection between religion and happiness.57  Once an obscure niche, the 
field has grown into a fruitful area of research at the forefront of 
psychology, sociology, and medicine.58  While the results have not been 
uniform, the weight of the evidence suggests that religiosity correlates 
with various indices of mental and physical well-being.59 
                                                                                                             
sense, highlighting the tenuous nature of the cultural anxiety-buffer 
and contributing to the need for ongoing bolstering and protection 
from threat.  To the extent that people need to believe that one and 
only one conception of reality is ultimately correct, the existence of 
conceptions at variance with their own implies that someone must be 
mistaken. 
Theory II, supra note 37, at 309. 
57 See generally HAROLD C. KOENIG ET AL., HANDBOOK OF RELIGION AND HEALTH 101–17 
(2001) (presenting data on numerous studies correlating religion with well-being). 
58 See id. at 97–98, 116–17 (identifying a growth in research into the connection between 
religion and happiness). 
59 See Diener et al., supra note 29, at 1278 (“In the National Opinion Research Center’s 
General Social Surveys of Americans between 1972 and 2008, the percentage of people 
reporting that they were ‘very happy’ ranged from 26% among those never attending 
religious services to 48% among those attending services more than weekly.”).  Ellison 
suggests that: 
[R]eligion may enhance various aspects of well-being in at least four 
ways:  1) through social integration and support; 2) through the 
establishment of personal relationships with a divine other; 3) through 
the provision of systems of meaning and existential coherence; and 4) 
through the promotion of more specific patterns of religious 
organization and personal lifestyle. 
Ellison, Religious Involvement, supra note 16, at 80.  Another scholar believes that: 
In large part, results from these studies have been consistent in 
indicating a salutary relationship between religious involvement and 
health status . . . Across this literature, the consistency of findings 
despite the diversity of samples, designs, methodologies, religious 
measures, health outcomes, and population characteristics actually 
serves to strengthen the inference of a positive association between 
religion and health. 
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A preliminary note is in order.  Happiness is a nebulous and 
capacious concept, encompassing various facets of well-being from 
short-term gratification to long-term fulfillment.  However, because 
religion appears to exert a salutary effect across these diverse measures 
of personal welfare, this Article will steer clear of the definitional morass 
and employ the catch-all term “happiness” to refer to generally pleasant 
states of being, from the ephemeral to the more enduring. 
It is worth observing that the social sciences—psychology in 
particular—have not always held such a sunny conception of religion.60  
Indeed, recent trends have marked a departure from the old Freudian 
view of religion as neurosis and pathology.61  On this traditional account, 
religion meant repression of primal impulses, guilt and shame at 
violating rigid precepts, and dread of a fiery hereafter.62  This attitude 
has by no means vanished.  It survives most prominently in the polemics 
of the “New Atheists,” who have tapped a fertile market for anti-
religious sentiment.63  It also finds some empirical support in a distinct 
minority of studies that have found that religion correlates with death, 
anxiety, guilt, and neuroticism.64 
                                                                                                             
Loren Marks, Religion and Bio-Psycho-Social Health:  A Review and Conceptual Model, 44 J. REL. 
& HEALTH 173, 179 (2005) (quoting KOENIG ET AL.).  “[D]ata from a national sample [show] 
that those who are most involved with their religion are almost twice as likely to report 
being ‘very happy’ than those with the least involvement . . . [R]eligious variables 
accounted for 5–7% of variance in life satisfaction.”  Daniel Mochon, Michael I. Norton & 
Dan Ariely, Who Benefits from Religion?, 101 SOC. INDICATORS RES. 1, 2 (2011) (citations 
omitted).  “[R]eligious adults report greater feelings of social integration, a personal 
relationship with a divine being, a good sense of cohesion in life, and a specified pattern of 
organization in which to live one’s life.  These outcomes are associated with greater levels 
of personal well-being for adults.”  Richard J. Petts & Chris Knoester, Parents’ Religious 
Heterogamy and Children’s Well-Being, 46 J. SCI. STUD. OF RELIGION 373, 374 (2007). 
60 See Marks, supra note 59, at 174 (“For the first three-quarters of the 20th century, the 
prevalent view of religion’s relationship to health among both medical and social scientists 
was apathetic at best, and actively hostile at worst.”). 
61 See id. (“By the mid-1990s, the pendulum of religion-related medical and social science 
publication seemed to have swung . . . to [] empirical work that frequently correlated 
religious experience with a variety of beneficial health-related outcomes. . . . ”). 
62 See id. (“This hostile camp is perhaps most conspicuously represented by Freud, who 
maligned religion as mankind’s universal obsessional neurosis.” (citation omitted)). 
63 See Diener et al., supra note 29, at 1279 (“Although religion is a widespread social and 
cultural phenomenon, its atheist critics claim that it is dysfunctional.  It is ‘dangerous 
nonsense’ that does ‘not make its adherents happy’ . . . This religion-breeds-misery meme 
resonates with the surmise of Sigmund Freud, who famously viewed religion as ‘a 
universal obsessional neurosis.’” (citations omitted)). 
64 See generally John Maltby, Protecting the Sacred and Expressions of Rituality:  Examining 
the Relationship Between Extrinsic Dimensions of Religiosity and Unhealthy Guilt, 78 PSYCHOL. 
AND PSYCHOTHERAPY:  THEORY, RES. & PRACTICE 77, 81 (2005) (explaining the connection 
between religion and negative psychological states). 
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Still, the thrust of the empirical literature is clear—religion appears 
to exert a salutary effect on happiness.65  This relationship appears across 
various dimensions of happiness—from transient well-being to abiding 
satisfaction, from the absence of depression and psychological pathology 
to affirmative contentment.66 
On a deeper level, however, complexities intrude that prevent a 
straightforward embrace of religion as a vehicle for happiness.  Religion 
is a complex and multifaceted construct, and researchers early 
recognized that more sophisticated measures of religiosity than 
“attendance at religious services” or “frequency of prayer” were 
necessary to comprehend the nexus between religion and happiness.67  
The most noted distinction that emerged was that between intrinsic and 
extrinsic religiosity.68 
A. The Intrinsic-Extrinsic Divide 
Many have asserted that the religion-happiness nexus owes to the 
social connections that religious involvement nurtures.69  Congregational 
                                                 
65 See generally KOENIG ET AL., supra note 57, at 101 (describing the correlation between 
religion and positive psychological states). 
66 Ellison et al., Does Religious Commitment Contribute, supra note 36, at 114–16, 106 
(defining life satisfaction as “essentially a cognitive assessment of progress toward desired 
goals—an evaluation of the congruence between ideal and real life circumstances” and 
noting its connection to religion).  Marks expands on this notion as follows: 
In addition to general ‘salutary religious effect,’ certain religious 
practices have also been correlated with positive coping in connection 
with both ‘acute’ and ‘day-to-day stresses’ of life in a wide variety of 
contexts . . . Religiosity has also been correlated with a number of 
specific positive mental health outcomes, including greater personal 
happiness and/or self-esteem . . . and lower rates of depression. 
Marks, supra note 59, at 180 (citations omitted).  See generally KOENIG ET AL., supra note 57, 
at 117 (summarizing the relationship between religion and happiness). 
67 See David H. Rosmarin, Kenneth I. Pargament & Annette Mahoney, The Role of 
Religiousness in Anxiety, Depression, and Happiness in a Jewish Community Sample:  A 
Preliminary Investigation, 12 MENTAL HEALTH, REL., & CULTURE 97, 99–100 (2009) (“[A]n 
emerging trend in psychology of religion research has been to study aspects of 
religiousness that are more proximally and functionally connected to psychological 
variables alongside measures of global religiousness.  Examples of proximal religiousness 
include perceived closeness to God, religious coping, sanctification, and religious/spiritual 
struggles.” (citations omitted)). 
68 See Ahmed M. Abdel-Khalek, Happiness, Health, and Religiosity:  Significant Relations, 9 
MENTAL HEALTH, REL. & CULTURE 85, 87–88 (2006) (“There are several recent theoretical 
and empirical studies emphasizing the different experiences and outcomes associated with 
diverse types of religiosity.  Foremost among them is the intrinsic versus extrinsic religious 
orientation.”). 
69 See Eichhorn, supra note 30, at 584−85 (“Religiosity might provide a safety net 
function, offering security and comfort particularly in difficult or uncertain life situations.  
The engagement in communal activities and the provision of a network of acquaintances 
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life can serve as a well-spring for personal relationships and a network of 
support in times of distress.70  Indeed, empirical research has amply 
demonstrated the connection between social ties and happiness.71  The 
religion-happiness connection, many have argued, is chiefly an extension 
of this well-corroborated insight. 
That congregational life forges intimate social connections is indeed 
an important part of the religion-happiness calculus.  Congregants 
derive pleasure, meaning, and comfort from the bonds that they develop 
with their coreligionists.72  Is such the essence of faith?  Does 
particularistic dogma belong on the periphery, with community and 
brotherhood at the fore? 
It is likely that this common explanation of the religion-happiness 
nexus misconceives the function of social connections.  How precisely it 
misunderstands this function is a subject to which this Article will return 
later.73  For now, it suffices to note that this explanation clashes with a 
well-established divide in the empirical literature.  Where intrinsic 
religiosity—religion for its own sake, true belief—correlates positively 
with happiness in its various manifestations, extrinsic religiosity—
religion for the purpose of achieving some ancillary objective, such as 
cultivating social ties or attaining inner peace—appears not to correlate 
positively, and in many instances appears to correlate negatively, with 
happiness.74  It is what is in the adherent’s mind, rather than religion’s 
                                                                                                             
and actual friends and supporters is a . . . community-inclusion focused, perspective 
commonly invoked to explain the findings.” (citation omitted)); Stark & Maier, supra note 
18, at 123, 125 (noting that “the effects of religion seem to be primarily ‘social’ rather than 
doctrinal . . . A number of scholars have suggested that . . . the major effect of religion on 
happiness is achieved by embedding people in supportive congregations where they enjoy 
warm social relationships.”); Witter et al., supra note 38, at 336–37 (“[R]eligion affects 
subjective well-being more strongly via the influence of social integration as compared to 
ego transcendence.  However, the interrelationships among social integration, religious 
participation, and religiosity may be complex.”). 
70 See Eichhorn, supra note 30, at 584–85 (explaining the correlation between religious 
communities and social support).  See generally KOENIG ET AL., supra note 65 at 458–61 
(identifying the positive effects of social support from religious organizations). 
71 See, e.g., Luke William Galen & James D. Kloet, Mental Well-Being in the Religious and 
Non-Religious:  Evidence for a Curvilinear Relationship, 14 MENTAL HEALTH, REL. & CULTURE 
673, 681 (2011) (“[M]embers of a cohesive group will display greater emotional stability to 
the extent that they are actively involved in a supportive social milieu.”). 
72 See Marks, supra note 59, at 176 (“[Religion] impacts psychological coping through 
social, emotional, and moral support a faith community can provide, particularly in times 
of stress, crisis, or bereavement.” (citation omitted)). 
73 See infra Part IV.B (considering possibly that the religion-happiness connection owes 
predominantly to the social connections that religious involvement facilitates). 
74 Kristopher J. Gauthier et al., Religiosity, Religious Doubt, and the Need for Cognition:  
Their Interactive Relationship with Life Satisfaction, 7 J. HAPPINESS STUD. 139, 140 (2006).  
Gauthier et al. stated: 
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practical value, that principally accounts for the religion-happiness 
connection.75 
To be sure, this does not definitively discredit the notion that 
religion properly understood should be emancipated from particularistic 
dogma.  There is much to commend a conception of religion that seeks to 
harness religion’s utility while shedding the zealotry and parochialism.  
But such a conception does not pave the way to personal happiness—
societal amity and understanding, perhaps, but not individual 
happiness.76 
That it is authentic conviction, rather than religion’s ancillary social 
or personal value, that undergirds the religion-happiness nexus tells us 
little about what sort of belief we should prefer if we desire happiness.  
Perhaps the elastic faith of the mainstream—the sort that tolerates and 
even encourages doubt—conduces best to happiness.  After all, such 
faith is generally undemanding, forgiving of waywardness, and less 
                                                                                                             
[E]xtrinsic religiosity (i.e., engaging in religion for external incentives 
such as social contacts), was negatively correlated with several 
indicators of mental well-being, including appropriate social behavior, 
freedom from worry and guilt, personal competence and control, and 
open-mindedness and flexibility.  Conversely, intrinsic religiosity (i.e., 
engaging in religion to integrate it into one’s daily affairs) was 
positively correlated with appropriate social behavior, freedom from 
worry and guilt, a sense of personal competence and control, and 
personality unification and organization. 
Id.; Karen Hwang, Joseph H. Hammer & Ryan T. Cragun, Extending Religion-Health Research 
to Secular Minorities:  Issues and Concerns, 50 J. REL. & HEALTH 608, 609 (2011) (“People also 
attend church services for a variety of reasons—e.g. for the social network or out of familial 
obligation—not always having to do with actual worship.”).  “10% of Americans who do 
not believe in a god attend religious services weekly, not out of religious devotion, but 
rather for pragmatic reasons, like preserving familial harmony or to maintain a circle of 
friendships.”  Id. (citations omitted); see also Maltby, supra note 64, at 78 (“Generally, 
research suggests that an intrinsic orientation towards religion is associated with better 
mental health, while an extrinsic orientation toward religion is associated with poorer 
mental health.”). 
75 See Eichhorn, supra note 30, at 583 (“[I]ntrinsic and extrinsic forms of religiosity 
differently affect the level of life-satisfaction.  Attitudinal evaluations of personal levels of 
religiosity tend to be positively associated with measures of subjective well-being.  
However, the same is not true for practiced aspects of religiosity, pointing to the relevance 
of distinguishing different mechanisms.” (citations omitted)); Ellison et al., Does Religious 
Commitment Contribute, supra note 36, at 105 (“Hadaway and Roof concluded:  ‘ . . . [I]t 
would appear that meaning is the more distinctively religious resource.  Not that religious 
belonging is unimportant, but the social integration it provides also can be provided by 
other voluntary organizations.’”); see also Marks, supra note 59, at 179 (“[T]he importance of 
one’s faith had the strongest association with positive mental health, even after controlling 
for the effect of other significant variables, age and education . . . highlighting attitudes 
rather than practices, as the stronger spiritual variables related to mental health . . . .”). 
76 See infra Part V (discussing the “growth-doubt” nexus). 
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prone to saddling its adherents with overpowering guilt.77  Who indeed 
should wish upon herself the rigors and anxieties of rigid fealty to 
religious doctrine?  She who seeks happiness should.78 
B. The Perils of Doubt, the Virtues of Certainty 
Having established that it is genuine belief and not religion’s 
extrinsic value that underlies the religion-happiness connection, we 
move to the substance of that belief.  What sort of conviction begets 
happiness—the temperate, flexible faith of the religious liberal or 
moderate, or the unbending, confident dogmatism of the 
fundamentalist?  A growing literature suggests the latter.79  Indeed, not 
only does religious doubt neutralize religion’s salutary effect on 
happiness, it tends to reverse it.80 
The empirical literature reveals an intriguing pattern—the religion-
happiness relationship appears to be non-linear.81  More religion, it 
                                                 
77 See Ellison et al., Does Religious Commitment Contribute, supra note 36, at 103–04 
(“Studies of denominational growth and decline have distinguished between ‘strong’ and 
‘weak’ denominations on the basis of their respective levels of internal pluralism, 
distinctiveness of lifestyle, social action, evangelism (sense of mission), ecumenicism, and 
other denominational traits.”).  “‘[S]trong’ or conservative churches [demand] high levels 
of loyalty and social solidarity, [] disciplining both beliefs and lifestyle, and [] fostering 
dogmatic absolutism.”  Id. (citations omitted). 
78 See supra Part III.B (explaining that strong conviction begets happiness). 
79 See Weber et al., supra note 34, at 80 (describing the link between fundamentalism and 
well-being).  Weber describes this link as follows: 
[S]trength of conviction, be it atheistic or religious, correlates with 
improved psychological health.  Degree of inner conviction is 
associated with degree of well-being:  for example, strong atheistic 
beliefs are comparable to strong religious beliefs in helping people 
cope with the challenges of aging [].  Christians with high levels of 
religious saliency have significantly lower levels of depressive 
symptoms. 
Id. (citations omitted); see also Ellison et al., Does Religious Commitment Contribute, supra note 
36, at 117 (finding important net effects of devotional intensity); see, e.g., Abdel-Khalek, 
supra note 68, at 87 (“[P]eople, who are religiously devout and committed to their 
tradition, . . . tend to enjoy better health both physical[ly] and mental[ly].” (citations 
omitted)); Hayward & Elliott, supra note 32, at 593 (“Having more orthodox religious 
beliefs has also been shown to be associated with better outcomes in terms of psychological 
well-being . . . ”). 
80 See Ellison et al., Religious Doubts, supra note 31, at 121 (“[A]lthough most work on 
religion and health has focused on salutary effects on health, there is now evidence that 
certain facets of religious engagement—termed ‘spiritual struggles’—can undermine health 
and well-being.”). 
81 See Weber et al., supra note 34, at 80 (examining the connection between lower levels 
of religious certainty and decreased well-being).  Weber explains: 
Just as greater conviction correlates with better health, less certainty of 
belief has been associated with decreased well-being.  Religious 
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seems, does not necessarily make a happy believer.82  Indeed, the 
religion-happiness connection appears to be “curvilinear,” with 
happiness declining as religiosity initially increases and rising after 
religiosity exceeds a certain threshold.83  While religious fundamentalists 
tend to be highest on the happiness continuum, religious liberals and 
moderates appear not to be any happier than agnostics.84  Perhaps most 
                                                                                                             
adherents with low certainty of belief may be less happy than non-
believers, with 47.3% of religious respondents to an online study 
reportedly less happy than atheists, 21.9% less happy than agnostics, 
and 14.4% less happy than those with no religious affiliation. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
82 See Marta Elliott & R. David Hayward, Religion and Life Satisfaction Worldwide:  The Role 
of Government Regulation, 70 SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION 285, 288 (2009) (“[I]n certain instances, 
religiosity is actually harmful to psychological well-being. . . .  [A] U-shaped relationship 
between religious salience and depression, indicating that those who felt their religion was 
‘not too important’ or ‘very important’ report higher levels of depression than those in 
between the two extremes. . . . [T]hose who were not at all religious or very religious had 
lower levels of depression than those found in the middle . . . ”) (citations omitted); see also 
Mochon et al., supra note 59, at 2 (“While those who believe strongly are very happy, those 
who believe weakly are less happy and may even be hurt by their affiliation [with] a 
religious group.”). 
83 See Galen & Kloet, supra note 71, at 675 (“[T]he highest levels of distress [were] in the 
weakly religious; the highly religious as well as the non-religious were the least 
distressed.”).  Galen and Kloet elaborate: 
In a sample of German adults, a curvilinear relationship was found 
between religiosity and depression with both the strictly religious and 
‘determined atheists’ scoring as the least depressed. . . . Similarly, 
[researchers have] found a curvilinear relationship between religious 
conviction and depression.  Certainty of beliefs (either strong 
religiousness or confident non-religiousness) was associated with 
better mental and physical health . . .  Several other authors have also 
found complex curvilinear relationships between religiosity and 
mental health by clearly separating the weakly religious and 
completely non-religious. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
84 See id. at 681 (analyzing the link between strength of religious beliefs and emotional 
stability).  This link is described as follows: 
Similar to previous literature, those with more certain religious beliefs, 
either strong belief in God or strong lack of belief in God, had greater 
emotional stability than those with weak or unsure beliefs.  Those 
highest in life satisfaction were both the strong believers and the strong 
non-believers, with the uncertain scoring intermediately.  The 
regression analysis demonstrated that, although some demographic or 
social covariates (sex, age, social contacts, and perceived social 
support), are also related to emotional stability, the curvilinear 
function of certainty of belief remained after controlling for these 
covariates and contributed small but significant incremental 
prediction. 
Id.  Mochon expands on this link: 
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revealing, atheists tend to be higher on the happiness scale than do 
religious liberals and moderates, although their happiness levels do not 
quite rise to the level of fundamentalists.85 
Still, religious moderation does not entail religious doubt; nor does 
religious fundamentalism entail religious certainty.  We should not 
assume that religious liberals and moderates are uniformly uncertain of 
their convictions while atheists and fundamentalists are monolithically 
free of doubt.  Nonetheless, the evidence supports the natural intuition 
that, while the dogmatic Unitarian and the doubt-ridden fundamentalist 
exist, they are rare breeds indeed.86  As such, there is scant evidence from 
which to glean any conclusions regarding the primacy of epistemological 
certainty over denominational ties or vice versa.  Nonetheless, research 
that more directly assesses the impact of doubt on happiness confirms its 
                                                                                                             
The most fervent believers clearly benefit from their religious 
affiliation.  People with religiosity levels of six and seven reported 
significantly higher well-being than the reference group (those with 
religiosity of one).  However, people with levels of four and five 
showed no benefit over the least religious people in our sample, and in 
fact, people with moderate to low adherence (those with levels of two 
and three) showed a significantly negative effect of religiosity.  Thus[,] 
while religious involvement clearly benefits some (the most fervent 
believers) it can also be detrimental to others. 
Mochon et al., supra note 59, at 8. 
85 See Galen & Kloet, supra note 71, at 685 (“[T]hose with high certainty of non-belief had 
greater mental well-being than those with moderate or unsure beliefs. . . . [T]hose with 
confident religious belief and disbelief reporting higher mental well-being than the 
uncertain believers.  Those non-religious subgroups with more definitive self-labels (atheist 
and humanist) had greater well-being than the self-labels associated with less categorical 
non-belief (agnostic, spiritual).”); Hwang, supra note 74, at 613 (“[I]nvestigators have found 
that strong atheists are no more likely to be depressed than strong believers, and are less 
depressed than weak believers or wavering agnostics.” (citations omitted)).  Other scholars 
suggest that: 
Were we to place our own children in the distribution of religiosity, the 
option with the highest expected well-being would entail enrolling 
them and encouraging them to believe strongly; were we not certain 
that our children would attain sufficient levels of belief, however, we 
might prefer them to remain unaffiliated.  Indeed, the non-linear 
relation between religiosity and well-being suggests that many 
moderate believers would benefit from reducing their level of 
religiosity rather than increasing it. 
Mochon et al., supra note 59, at 10–12. 
86 See Jenny L. Small & Nicholas A. Bowman, Religious Commitment, Skepticism, and 
Struggle Among U.S. College Students:  The Impact of Majority/Minority Religious Affiliation and 
Institutional Type, 50 J. FOR SCI. STUDY RELIGION 154, 158 (2011) (“Unitarians, Jews, and 
students with no religious affiliation score highly on a measure of religious skepticism, 
whereas Mormons, Seventh Day Adventists, Baptists, and ‘other Christians’ score much 
lower.”).  See generally PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUBLIC LIFE, U.S. RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE 
SURVEY 1 (2007) (presenting survey responses to the question “All in all, are you satisfied or 
dissatisfied with the way things are going in this country today?”). 
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corrosive influence.87  Persistent doubt tends to reverse religion’s 
generally salubrious effect on happiness.88  The doubt-plagued report a 
higher incidence of anxiety and depression, evince more negative affect, 
and experience diminished feelings of satisfaction and purpose relative 
to more stalwart believers.89  She who seeks happiness, it seems, should 
opt for resolute faith or confident non-belief.  Nuance and flexibility, an 
                                                 
87 See Gauthier et al., supra note 74, at 141 (“[R]eligious doubt was negatively correlated 
with positive affect, and positively correlated to depression, suggesting that religious 
doubt does not display any visible benefits to mental health.”); Neal Krause & Christopher 
G. Ellison, A Longitudinal Study of the Precipitants and Consequences of Religious Doubt in Older 
Adults, 48 J. FOR SCI. STUDY RELIGION 293, 293 (2009) (“[G]reater religious certainty is 
associated with greater happiness and greater life satisfaction.”); Weber et al., supra note 34, 
at 73 (“Religious doubt and feelings of alienation from God have been associated with 
increased depressive symptoms.” (citations omitted)).  Ellison and his colleagues 
summarize previous findings as follows: 
Ellison [] showed that the absence of doubts—which he characterized 
as ‘existential certainty’—was positively associated with life 
satisfaction and happiness in a cross-sectional probability sample of 
U.S. adults. . . .  Krause and associates [] found that religious doubts 
were linked with both positive and depressed affect (in opposite 
directions). . . .  Krause and Wulff [] showed that religious doubting 
was associated with lower levels of satisfaction with health, as well as 
higher levels of distress. . . .  Galek and colleagues [] examined data 
from a nationwide online survey, finding that religious doubts were 
positively related to symptoms of a number of mental health 
problems . . . including depression, anxiety, phobia, paranoia, and 
hostility. . . .  [O]ur results confirm several robust associations between 
religious doubts and poor sleep quality.  These associations persist 
despite controls for an array of sociodemographic and behavioral 
covariates, including age, mental and physical health, stressful life 
events, attendance at religious services, frequency of prayer, and 
attachment to God. 
Ellison et al., Religious Doubts, supra note 31, at 122–23, 130 (citations omitted); see, e.g., Neil 
Krause et al., Aging, Religious Doubt, and Psychological Well-Being, 39 GERONTOLOGIST 525, 
532 (1999) [hereinafter Krause, Aging] (“[R]eligious doubt is associated with greater 
depressive symptomatology and less positive affect.”). 
88 See Krause & Wulff, supra note 44, at 39 (“[I]f people are more deeply immersed in 
religion, and they seriously question their faith, then the effects of doubt are likely to be 
more consequential.”).  “[T]hose who occupy formal roles in the church should be more 
troubled by religious doubts because doubt threatens roles and identities that are highly 
salient to them.”  Id. at 40; see Weber et al., supra note 34, at 73 (“Religious doubt [] and 
feelings of alienation from God [] have been associated with increased depressive 
symptoms.” (citations omitted)). 
89 See Ellison et al., Religious Resources, supra note 18, at 290 (“[U]nresolved doubts can be 
profoundly disconcerting for religious adherents.  Doubts can deprive the individual of a 
coherent religious belief system and sense of coherence, which otherwise provides a means 
of interpreting and assigning meaning to daily affairs and personal crises alike.”).  
“[R]eligious doubts are associated with elevated levels of psychological distress and 
psychiatry symptoms, and inversely associated with life satisfaction and other indicators of 
well-being.”  Id. (citations omitted). 
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earnest attempt to marry faith and free inquiry—these may be the 
hallmarks of the mature, enlightened believer.  But they do not appear to 
light the path to happiness. 
These findings accord with the theoretical literature discussed above.  
While the comparatively tepid faith of mainline denominations demands 
less of and more readily forgives its followers, such elasticity comes at 
the price of epistemological order.90  Whereas the more zealous faith of 
the religiously devout accords its devotees a comprehensive 
epistemological architecture with which to interpret phenomena, the 
faith of the epistemologically unsure is more scaffolding than solid 
edifice—a general framework perhaps, but riddled with gaps and 
vulnerabilities.91  As discussed above, attachment and ETAS theorists 
posit that human beings seek stability and security in a perilous, 
uncertain world.92  Inasmuch as religious certainty satisfies our basic 
desire for order and coherence, it should make us less anxiety-prone, 
more optimistic, and better able to function in daily life.  The empirical 
                                                 
90 See Ellison et al., Does Religious Commitment Contribute, supra note 36, at 103 
(“Religious experience and/or personal faith—devotional intensity—may facilitate a 
comprehensive interpretive framework through which the individual can make sense of 
the totality of human existence and its vicissitudes.”). 
91 Ellison, Religious Involvement, supra note 16, at 82.  “The literature on contemporary 
patterns of denominational growth and decline distinguishes between ‘strong’ conservative 
Protestant groups and ‘weak’ mainline and liberal Protestant churches.”  “[Strong 
denominations] require higher levels of organizational commitment and social 
solidarity. . . . distinctive lifestyles and behavioral conformity.”  Id.  “[T]hey foster 
absolutism and ideological closure rather than pluralism and tolerance, [and as such] are 
more effective than weaker churches in sustaining coherent systems of religious meaning.”  
Id. (citations omitted); see Galen & Kloet, supra note 71, at 686 (examining the relationship 
between mental health and religious involvement).  Galen & Kloet describe this 
relationship as follows: 
Rather than specifically religious content being a prerequisite for 
mental well-being, it is likely that existential certainty or coherence of a 
worldview mediates the relationship between religious participation 
and mental health.  For example, system justification theory, the belief 
in a just world, and terror management theory all suggest that 
ideological confidence in a coherent worldview may buffer anxiety, 
and that religious belief may assist in increasing this 
confidence . . . .  Conversely, doubting one’s worldview is associated 
with higher distress. 
Id. (citations omitted); see also Gribbins & Vandenberg, supra note 53, at 106–07 (“[Religion] 
is in essence a ‘meta-belief’ or worldview.  This worldview provides an absolute 
foundation for determining what is and what should be, what is good and evil, and what is 
known and unknowable, which are conferred by an omniscient, omnipotent being.” 
(citations omitted)). 
92 See supra Part II.A (explaining that humans seek to neutralize external threats by 
cultivating an attachment with God). 
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evidence corroborates this intuition.93  Religious doubt, by contrast, 
erodes the epistemological anchor that religion provides.  It creates 
lacunas in an interpretive framework that for fundamentalists operates 
as a ready, comprehensive guide to an unstable universe.94  As such, 
attachment and ETAS theories predict precisely the results recounted 
above—albeit with two notable caveats.  First, ETAS theory predicts that 
religion should yield psychological benefits only when it neutralizes 
threats to human welfare.95  A capricious, vindictive God should 
generate the opposite effect, a point this Article will address later.96 
The second caveat is more complicated—at first blush, attachment 
and ETAS theories do not account for the contented atheist.  Why should 
belief in the non-existence of God buoy one against the hazards and 
uncertainties of human existence?  Although empirical work on the 
belief systems of atheists is sparse, it seems clear that atheists are 
generally not devoid of conviction.97  Many have highly developed 
worldviews that they embrace as unreservedly as the fundamentalist 
                                                 
93 See Elliott & Hayward, supra note 82, at 287–88 (“[A] sense of a direct connection with 
the divine was associated with greater life satisfaction.”); Ellison et al., Religious Doubts, 
supra note 31, at 123 (“[R]eligious doubts can result in feelings of powerlessness, 
hopelessness, worry and fear, which may in turn trigger the release of stress hormones that 
promote mental and physiological arousal.” (citations omitted)); Thurow, supra note 25 
(“[S]tudies [have found] support for the notion that a close relationship to God (or a higher 
source) positively relates to health and well-being . . . ”). 
94 See Ellison, Religious Involvement, supra note 16, at 82 (“A leading proponent of this 
view is Berger, who argues that religion offers a comprehensive framework for the 
ordering and interpretation of human events.  Thus, in the context of strong beliefs 
regarding matters of ultimate concern, seemingly routine personal affairs may take on 
particular meaning and significance.”). 
95 See supra Part II.A (explaining how a loving God offers safety and stability). 
96 See infra Part VI (explaining the reliance of the poor and uneducated on religion). 
97 See Jonathan Morgan, Untangling False Assumptions Regarding Atheism and Health, 48 
ZYGON 9, 15 (2013) (“[P]erhaps the strongest critique of this link between health and belief 
is the paucity of research on nonbelievers.” (citation omitted)).  “[A]theists are [] more 
prone to find their meaning in ‘this world.’ [Many] have argued that secular nonbelievers 
‘have a stronger sense of social justice than do religious individuals.’”  Id. at 14 (citation 
omitted).  Hwang suggests that: 
[Conventional] measures are unable to reliably distinguish between 
individuals with affirmatively secular worldviews and those believers 
whose belief systems are vague, transitory[,] or conflicted. . . .  [W]e 
encourage further investigation of the medical and psychosocial assets 
of affirmatively secular individuals (as opposed to the ‘nonreligious’).  
Particularly relevant are studies identifying the strengths and benefits 
associated with an explicitly secular world view, especially the ways in 
which a secular world view can enhance a person’s overall health and 
quality of life. 
Hwang, supra note 74, at 612, 617. 
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does scripture.98  To the extent this holds true, the happy atheist is 
explicable from an attachment standpoint—as with the fundamentalist, a 
comprehensive ideational framework offers a buffer against moral and 
intellectual chaos.99  ETAS theory provides little insight here, however—
that is, unless the atheist’s worldview involves some threat-neutralizing 
mechanism, which seems doubtful.  In any case, we need not rely on 
attachment or ETAS theories to explain the happy atheist—or for that 
matter, the curvilinear relationship between religion and happiness.  
Indeed, the theory of cognitive dissonance illuminates these 
phenomena.100 
The human aversion to cognitive dissonance more directly accounts 
both for the contended atheist and for the curvilinear relationship 
between religion and happiness.101  Where agnostics and religious 
moderates often remain stranded between the poles of faith and non-
belief, atheists and fundamentalists need not endure this psychic 
struggle.102  They can rest comfortably at one extreme or the other, 
sparing themselves the energy and anguish that come with efforts to 
harmonize beliefs or behaviors.103  They avoid the moral and intellectual 
limbo to which a more nuanced stance might condemn them. 
Reconciling these findings with terror management theory sheds 
valuable light on the psychological advantages of epistemological 
certainty.  From a terror management standpoint, the curvilinear 
relationship between religion and happiness and the phenomenon of the 
                                                 
98 See Galen & Kloet, supra note 71, at 675 (“Those with a self-identity as atheists may 
focus more on a narrower rejection of religious claims but others who self-identify as 
secular humanists may also include affirmations of human progress or growth.” (citation 
omitted)). 
99 See id. at 686 (“It may be the case that confidently non-religious individuals have a 
committed worldview, with meaning derived from relationships, science, philosophy, or 
the arts in an analogous way to a religious individual deriving meaning from religious 
beliefs.”). 
100 See supra Part II.C (explaining the theory of cognitive dissonance). 
101 See Galen & Kloet, supra note 71, at 674 (“Holding beliefs with strong conviction may 
itself exert a salutary effect and reduce anxiety caused by cognitive dissonance.  For 
example, in the absence of subjective certainty, people often experience a state of 
psychological aversion that they are motivated to reduce.”). 
102 See Weber et al., supra note 34, at 82 (“Interestingly, there appears to be a correlation 
between strength of conviction in one’s religious (or nonreligious) worldview and 
psychological well-being.  This correlation is supported by findings connecting greater 
existential certainty with decreased depressive symptoms.” (citations omitted)). 
103 See id. at 83 (“[A] bimodal relationship [appears to exist] between religiosity and 
health, with the greatest health experienced by the most and least religious 
individuals. . . .  [S]trong atheists appear to enjoy the same psychological benefits as 
strongly religious individuals.”). 
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happy atheist may seem anomalous.104  Insofar as agnosticism and 
moderate religiosity allow for the possibility—if not the probability—of 
immortality, they should allay rather than intensify our terror of death.  
As such, terror management theory would predict a linear relationship 
between religion and happiness.  But here we must recall that the human 
desire for immortality is not confined to immortality in the conventional 
religious or celestial sense.105  Rather, our dread of death engenders a 
more general impetus toward meaning and permanence.106  If atheists 
are more likely than agnostics or religious moderates to develop 
comprehensive worldviews—in the form of a resolute commitment to 
secular humanism or scientific thinking, for example—then terror 
management theory would predict a decline in happiness as one initially 
ascends the religiosity scale, followed by a rise as comprehensive 
worldviews reemerge at a certain religiosity threshold.  Such worldviews 
come with ideals that outlast the individual and imbue her with 
meaning, purpose, and a sense of permanence in the face of her 
mortality.107  To undermine them is to erode a powerful buffer against 
our terror of death. 
IV.  CUES TO DOUBT:  DISSONANT STIMULI AND CHALLENGES TO 
EPISTEMOLOGICAL CERTAINTY 
How do we preserve this powerful psychological palliative when the 
world constantly besets us with reminders of the cracks in our 
epistemological armor?  We observe that others manage to resist our 
systems of meaning and belief, that they embrace diametrically opposed 
worldviews, and that the world is full of uncomfortable facts that throw 
                                                 
104 See supra Part II.B (discussing the theory that belief in an afterlife conduces the 
happiness). 
105 See id. (explaining that people seek meaning and performance from their belief 
systems generally, regardless of whether their belief systems are religious in nature). 
106 See Morris & McAdie, supra note 33, at 116 (“Terror Management Theory (TMT) states 
that humans have a very deep fear of death and have created ‘cultural world views’ such as 
belief in the afterlife (BA) to control this anxiety.  TMT has been supported by research 
which shows that subjects will score higher on a BA scale following exposure to a death 
threat condition.” (citation omitted)). 
107 See Julie Juola Exline, Stumbling Blocks on the Religious Road:  Fractured Relationships, 
Nagging Vices, and the Inner Struggle to Believe, 13 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 182, 186 (2002) 
(“Religious beliefs help people to make sense of the world and to find a sense of meaning 
or purpose in existence.  In fact, this meaning-making aspect of religion seems to be one the 
major mediators of the association between religion and health.” (citation omitted)); supra 
Part II.B (explaining that, when faced with mortality, people have a strong desire to 
reinforce their cultural and political values). 
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our epistemologies into chaos.  How do we cope with external cues to 
doubt our convictions?108 
If epistemological certainty underlies the religion-happiness nexus, 
we would expect such cues to attenuate that nexus.  The evidence indeed 
suggests that such stimuli weaken, destroy, or even reverse religion’s 
salutary effect on happiness.  Researchers have found, for instance, that 
the religion-happiness nexus all but evaporates in comparatively 
irreligious societies, where the faithless appear to be roughly as 
contented as the faithful.109  In this same vein, religious diversity appears 
to undermine the relationship between religion and happiness.110  The 
following section elaborates on the role that conformity with social 
norms plays in the religion-happiness nexus. 
A. A Conformity Effect? 
Might these findings reveal a simple conformity effect?  That is, 
might the religion-happiness nexus owe to the comfort of knowing that 
one is not alone or aberrant, such that the roots of the nexus are external 
to epistemology?111  This appears unlikely.  Indeed, it seems more 
                                                 
108 See Harmer-Dionne, supra note 48, at 1316 (“Festinger posited that, to reduce 
dissonance, one may change one’s own behavior, change one’s environment, or most 
drastically, change the very cognition (i.e., belief or opinion) that is in conflict with the 
behavior or the environment[.]” (footnote omitted)); Bertram Gawronski, Back to the Future 
of Dissonance Theory:  Cognitive Consistency as a Core Motive, 30 SOC. COGNITION 652, 653 
(2012) (“[I]nconsistency serves as an epistemic cue for errors in one’s system of beliefs, 
thereby imposing a ubiquitous constraint on thinking and reasoning that goes far beyond 
the well-known demonstrations of dissonance-related attitude change.”). 
109 See Diener et al., supra note 29, at 1289 (“Our analyses suggest that individual 
religiosity is most beneficial to [subjective well-being] when it is congruent with the 
culture, that is, if religion is widespread in the society. Where organized religiosity is in the 
minority, religiosity does not have a clear benefit for [subjective well-being].”); Adam 
Okulicz-Kozaryn, Does Religious Diversity Make Us Unhappy?, 14 MENTAL HEALTH, 
RELIGION & CULTURE 1063, 1063, 1070 (2011) (“Religious people are happier than 
nonreligious people in religious countries, but not necessarily in non-religious 
countries. . . .  People like to live among like-minded individuals—religion provide[s] social 
identity—and the need to belong is one of the most fundamental human needs.” (citations 
omitted)). 
110 See Okulicz-Kozaryn, supra note 109, at 1064 (“[R]eligious diversity makes us 
unhappy. . . .  Religious diversity retards church participation, and church participation is 
the form of religiosity that contributes most to well-being, because it promotes social 
capital.” (citations omitted)). 
111 See Eichhorn, supra note 30, at 590 (considering the effect of religious cultures on life 
satisfaction).  One scholar suggests that: 
[P]eople tend to experience life-satisfaction enhancing effects when 
they place higher importance in god while living in a country where 
attendance of religious services is higher.  These findings suggest that 
positive effects of religiosity may not be intrinsic.  For the countries 
sampled, people do not appear to be happier, because they, 
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probable that conformity reinforces epistemological certainty, which in 
turn promotes happiness.  Recall the curvilinear relationship between 
religion and happiness.112  Americans evidently do not hold those at the 
extremes of the belief spectrum—those who appear to occupy the upper 
strata of the happiness continuum—in particularly high esteem.  Atheists 
in particular are the objects of perhaps uniquely powerful scorn, yet they 
appear relatively contented.113  Mormons and Jehovah’s Witnesses are 
hardly comfortable within the mainstream, yet these groups excel at 
attaining happiness.114 
These realities belie the conformity hypothesis.  It is worth noting, 
however, that any analysis of a potential conformity effect requires that 
we first identify the relevant unit to which the individual would feel 
pressure to conform.  Society at large may not be the appropriate metric.  
Rather, atheists and devout believers might inhabit social circles to 
whose norms they faithfully conform—circles whose approbation they 
seek far more keenly than that of mainstream society. 
Ultimately, we may be able to trace the religion-happiness nexus to 
the effects of both epistemological certainty and conformity.115  Perhaps 
                                                                                                             
individually, are more religious.  People who place a higher 
importance in god, however, are happier when they live in a country 
where others do as well. . . . [I]t appears to be that happiness through 
religiosity can mainly be derived through conforming to the standard 
in their country—in particular the visible standard. 
Id. 
112 See supra Part III.B (explaining that atheists and individuals with extreme religious 
beliefs are happier than those who experience significant epistemological doubt). 
113 See Weber et al., supra note 34, at 81 (“In response to a nationwide telephone survey, a 
large number of Americans stated that they were likely to disapprove of their children 
marrying atheists, and many felt that atheists were the group ‘ . . . least likely to share their 
vision of American society.’” (citation omitted)).  “One [study] indicated 
that . . . disapproval placed atheists at the top of Americans’ list of problematic groups, 
representing levels of public rejection higher than that of Muslims in post-9/11 America.”  
Id. at 83 (citation omitted). 
114 See Ellison, Religious Involvement, supra note 16, at 91 (“With regard to the Mormons 
and Jehovah’s Witnesses, the pattern of results is consistent with recent research on other 
aspects of well-being.”).  “It seems likely that conformity to the distinctive lifestyle 
demands of these groups . . . may reduce the occurrence of health problems, interpersonal 
and familial tensions, and other personal stressors.”  Id. 
115  See Ellison et al., Does Religious Commitment Contribute, supra note 36, at 103 (“[T]he 
religious community may serve as a ‘plausibility structure.’  Ideation and activity may be 
dialectically related, with religious participation reinforcing and solidifying individual 
religious convictions and the subjective interpretations of personal experiences.” (citation 
omitted)).  According to Robert Higgs: 
[A]s people internalize ‘the values and precepts of their communities 
of shared belief, [they] not only feel better about themselves but 
become trustworthy adherents who will act in accordance with their 
ideology without, or even in opposition to, external material 
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we cannot even disentangle the two.  Conformity might reinforce 
epistemological certainty, for the conformer need not cope with the 
disquieting presence of so many heretics in her midst.  But 
epistemological certainty might also strengthen a sense of conformity to 
prevailing norms.116  Researchers have not yet squarely attempted to 
disaggregate these variables and determine which more proximally 
impacts happiness.  Still, there is compelling evidence that 
epistemological certainty positively affects happiness, and the possibility 
of an alternative explanation—in particular one that dovetails with an 
epistemological certainty effect—does not negate the force of that 
evidence. 
B. Conformity as Plausibility 
Here, it is worth returning to the hypothesis that the religion-
happiness connection owes predominantly to the social connections that 
religious involvement facilitates.  I asserted earlier that, in light of the 
finding that extrinsic religiosity does not correlate with happiness, this 
theory likely misconceives the role of social ties in the religion-happiness 
calculus.117  It seems more probable that such connections function as 
“plausibility structures,” ratifying one’s epistemology through the 
                                                                                                             
enticement,’ a state of being which provides even greater self-esteem.  
The social isolation of ideologically homogenous groups ultimately 
produces extralegal cooperation and allows these groups to produce 
collective benefits not otherwise available. 
Harmer-Dionne, supra note 48, at 1314 (footnote omitted).  See also Hayward & Elliott, supra 
note 32, at 604 (“[T]here is strong support for the idea that being similar to other members 
of one’s religious groups . . . is beneficial for individual well-being . . . .  This holds up for 
demographic characteristics, religious values and preferences, devotional behavior, and 
participation within the congregation.”).  “[T]he number of other members in the same 
congregation who checked the same values as important was a strong predictor of both the 
degree to which an individual’s spiritual needs were met and the amount of help provided 
by religion in daily life.”  Id. 
116 See Harmer-Dionne, supra note 48, at 1314 (“[P]eople internalize ‘the values and 
precepts of their communities of shared belief, they not only feel better about themselves 
but become trustworthy adherents who will act in accordance with their ideology . . . .’” 
(footnote omitted)); Krause and Wulff, supra note 44, at 39 (“[S]hared behavioral 
expectations associated with social roles promote a sense of meaning and purpose in life.  
This function is important because research consistently shows that a life that is 
experienced as meaningful is an important precursor to well-being.” (citations omitted)).  
See also Krause & Ellison, supra note 87, at 296 (“An individual’s confidence in religious 
explanations is strengthened to the extent that others express their confidence in them.” 
(citation omitted)). 
117 See Ellison, Religious Involvement, supra note 16, at 89 (“[W]hereas most previous 
research in this area focused on church attendance and private devotion, the pattern of 
results presented here suggests that these aspects of religiosity contribute to well-being 
indirectly, for the most part, by strengthening religious beliefs and world views.”). 
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collective assent of one’s peers.118  External cues to doubt one’s 
epistemology—religious diversity or prevalent unbelief, for instance—
open fissures in these plausibility structures, attenuating the religion-
                                                 
118 See Ellison et al., Does Religious Commitment Contribute, supra note 36, at 115 (“[The 
results suggested] the relative primacy of those religious factors that are not specific to any 
one particular denomination or sect.  However, two denominations are exceptions[]:  
Southern Baptist and ‘Other Baptist.’”).  “The persistent importance of membership in the 
Southern Baptists, the sole fundamentalist denomination identifiable from these data, may 
be best interpreted in light . . . of religious ‘plausibility structures’ . . . The link between the 
strong plausibility structure of more conservative denominations and well-being 
may . . . diminish existential ambiguity or ambivalence[.]”  Id. at 115–16.  Ellison also states: 
Coherent religious belief systems can shape one’s fundamental 
assumptions about the world and one’s place within it.  Such religious 
plausibility structures often provide an organizing principle via which 
one conducts routine affairs, defines role and performs responsibilities, 
and nurtures relationships.  Thus, religious meaning systems may 
provide toolkits with which individuals make sense of daily events, 
major life changes, and traumatic crises. 
Ellison et al., Religious Doubts, supra note 31, at 122 (citations omitted); see also Harmer-
Dionne, supra note 48, at 1317 (“When in disagreement with others, one tends to reject 
those with whom one disagrees and seek out those who share similar cognitions.  This 
social support, on an immediate level, tends to block the discomfort produced by 
dissonance with the larger society.” (footnote omitted)).  See Ellison et al., Does Religious 
Commitment Contribute, supra note 36, at 104 (“The solidarity and ideological reinforcement 
provided by a religious community embodying a relatively distinctive lifestyle and 
dogmatic homogeneity may constitute a subculture.”).  Ellison and colleagues further state: 
In such a context, [the] dialectical relationship between beliefs and 
practices may provide a distinctive interpretive [] coherence not found 
in other communities.  Conversely, to the extent that ‘weak’ churches 
(or denominations) are characterized by a tolerance of doctrinal 
heterodoxy, internal political dissent, and a pluralism of 
lifestyles . . . the absence of precisely such an all-encompassing 
interpretive framework seems likely.  Thus, the character of 
plausibility structures may vary by denomination. 
Id. (citation omitted); see also Ellison, Religious Involvement, supra note 16, at 81 (“Religious 
communities may promote fundamental norms regarding health behaviors, interpersonal 
and familial relationships, business dealings, and other dimensions of personal lifestyles 
that facilitate well-being. . . .  Thus, the experience of worshiping in a group may reinforce 
private beliefs and may increase the centrality of religious interpretations of personal life 
experiences.”).  “[C]hurches and synagogues offer institutional settings and regular 
opportunities for social intercourse between persons of like minds and similar values.”  Id. 
(citations omitted).  Theory II states: 
The cultural anxiety-buffer is maintained largely through the 
consensual validation provided in cultural rituals and informal 
interactions with others.  When people’s beliefs and evaluations of 
themselves are shared by others, it increases the confidence with which 
those beliefs and evaluations are held . . . .  [W]hen others agree it 
provides a high level of consensus for the belief, which implies that the 
belief is externally determined and not a result of personal bias or 
perspective. 
Theory II, supra note 37, at 309 (citations omitted). 
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happiness connection.119  Here, too, the possibility of a conformity effect 
remains—though the role of social ties throws into particularly sharp 
relief the futility of disentangling conformity from epistemological 
certainty.120  Conformity buttresses epistemological certainty, which, in 
turn, bolsters the feeling of conformity.121  Ultimately, the distinction 
between epistemological certainty and conformity may be more illusory 
than actual.122 
V.  THE MATURE SKEPTIC:  THE GROWTH-DOUBT NEXUS 
This Article has attempted to show how epistemological certainty 
buoys one against instability and uncertainty, preserves a sense of 
ideational coherence, and shields one against the dread of death.  But I 
must reiterate the caveat I issued earlier—this analysis is not a full-
throated defense of religious or epistemological certainty, but rather a 
call to reckon with the perils of doubt.123  Those perils are not dispositive.  
                                                 
119 See Okulicz-Kozaryn, supra note 109, at 1063 (“Religiosity improves well-being by 
providing so-called ‘plausibility structures.’” (citation omitted)).  Okulicz-Kozaryn further 
explains these structures as follows: 
Plausibility structure is more fundamental than social capital; it is a 
sociocultural context for systems of meanings and beliefs in a 
society. . . . People seem to be happiest living among like-minded 
others who share similar values and norms. . . . Religions differ in their 
explanations of the world, and there arises the question:  which 
explanation is true? 
Id. at 1063–64 (citations omitted). 
120 See Ellison, Religious Involvement, supra note 16, at 89 (“This study supports the view 
that religious symbols and beliefs provide an interpretative framework through which 
individuals can make sense of everyday reality.” (citation omitted)).  “Further, the overall 
pattern of results suggests that the beneficent consequences of religious attendance and 
divine relations noted in previous work actually may reflect their roles in the creation and 
maintenance of religious plausibility structures.”  Id.  “[T]his theme has important roots in 
classical sociological theory:  although Durkheim sometimes is interpreted as suggesting 
that religion promotes well-being mainly through social integration, closer examination 
clarifies his view that collective religious commitments nurture coherent plausibility 
structures[.]”  Id. (citation omitted). 
121 See Ellison et al., Does Religious Commitment Contribute, supra note 36, at 103 (“A 
participatory dimension of religiosity may also be positively associated with life 
satisfaction . . . [because a religious institution] may provide an institutional setting in 
which individuals with shared value orientations can interact[.]”).  “[T]he religious 
community may serve as a ‘plausibility structure.’  Ideation and activity may be 
dialectically related, with religious participation reinforcing and solidifying individual 
religious convictions and the subjective interpretations of personal experiences.”  Id. 
(citation omitted). 
122 See Small & Bowman, supra note 86, at 170 (“[R]eligious commitment, religious 
engagement, and having friends with similar religious beliefs all build upon and contribute 
to one another.”). 
123 See supra Part I (maintaining that doubt has many virtues). 
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In the final analysis, we must weigh them against the societal toll that 
dogmatism exacts.  That balance is beyond the scope of this analysis, 
which I have confined to the psychological impact of doubt on the 
individual.  Even from the standpoint of the individual, however, the 
discussion thus far has painted an incomplete picture of psychological 
health.  Are psychological well-being and happiness truly coterminous?  
What of personal growth, self-knowledge, and the capacity for 
interpersonal understanding?  Might epistemological certainty promote 
happiness but stunt personal maturation?  The evidence furnishes some 
support for this proposition.124  I will move now to a discussion of this 
growth-happiness divide, but I urge the reader in advance to ponder 
whether a society of discontented sophisticates is indeed desirable. 
A. The Virtues of Doubt 
Liberal theologians and religious philosophers have long averred 
that faith and doubt reinforce each other in happy dialectical fashion.125  
Faith and doubt, they insist, are not antitheses—for true faith, the faith of 
the mature, self-aware believer, positively requires doubt.126  In Paul 
Tillich’s articulation, “[d]oubt is not the opposite of faith.  It is an 
element of faith.”127  The faithful of modern sensibilities exhort us to 
attune ourselves to our innermost selves, to grapple with our deepest 
                                                 
124 See infra Part V.A–B (discussing the effects of epistemological certainty on happiness 
and personal growth). 
125 See Krause, Religious Doubt and Psychological Well-Being, supra note 52, at 96 (“[S]ome 
theologians and researchers maintain that religious doubt should be embraced because it is 
the gateway to a deeper and more meaningful faith.”).   Krause elaborates: 
In fact, some of these scholars argue that doubt is the very essence of 
faith itself.  This perspective is, perhaps, nowhere more evident than in 
the writing of Paul Tillich, who . . . maintained that, ‘Many Christians, 
as well as members of other religious groups, feel anxiety, guilt and 
despair about what they call ‘loss of faith.’  But serious doubt is 
confirmation of faith.’  Similar views are reflected in the work of 
Allport . . . .  In fact, doubt is considered to be one of the driving forces 
behind Fowler’s higher stages of the development of faith. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
126 See Dale M. Hilty, Religious Belief, Participation and Consequences, An Exploratory and 
Confirmatory Analysis, 27 J. FOR THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF RELIGION 243, 244 (1988)  (“Allport 
suggests that crises can have a positive influence on the evolutionary integration of the 
religious experience within the development of the personality.” (citation omitted)).  
“[D]oubt is the key stimulus in the individual’s movement from the first stage (i.e., raw 
credulity) to the last stage (i.e., mature belief) in Allport’s three stage theory of belief 
development.”  Id. (citations omitted); see also Krause & Wulff, supra note 44, at 37 (“[Many] 
scholars maintain that having doubts about religion lies at the very heart of living a 
religious life, and that it is not possible to be deeply religious without having doubts about 
one’s faith.”). 
127 See PAUL TILLICH, SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY VOLUME TWO 116 (1957). 
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doubts and insecurities.128  In so doing, they insist, we achieve that 
rarefied state of serenity and self-knowledge accessible only after 
sustained struggle.129 
The evidence suggests that religious doubt and struggle may well be 
a vehicle for personal growth, the path to a deeper, more complete 
personhood.130  Those prone to such struggle report heightened 
interpersonal understanding, enhanced tolerance of others, and greater 
empathy.131  Some emerge from the crucible of doubt with their faiths 
strengthened or reinvigorated, having fended off doubt’s advances.132  
                                                 
128 See, e.g., Alpert, supra note 12 (arguing that effective teaching forces students to 
question assumptions); GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE INDIVIDUAL AND HIS RELIGION 73 (1951) 
(“[T]he mature religious sentiment is ordinarily fashioned in the workshop of doubt.”); 
Krause, Religious Doubt and Psychological Well-Being, supra note 52, at 106–07 (“Perhaps the 
point of wrestling with doubt is not to be content, satisfied, or happy—instead it may 
simply be to learn. . . .  Maybe the exercise of doubting is sufficient . . . to bring about 
desired social aims, and . . . the resolution of ultimate concerns, such as confirming the 
existence of God, is beside the point.”). 
129 See Krause, Religious Doubt and Psychological Well-Being, supra note 52, at 96 (examining 
the view that doubt is constructive).  Krause explains: 
[This] view . . . is based on the belief that faith is something that must 
be reflected upon and reasoned out. . . .[I]t is not something that is 
achieved effortlessly, . . . [but rather something that] must be earned 
through an arduous process of deep contemplation as well as 
relentless searching and questioning.  This view is consistent with 
basic principles in developmental psychology, which suggest that 
cognitive development is driven by uncertainty and doubt.  The 
essence of this perspective is reflected in the work of Batson and his 
colleagues on the religious quest[, who] maintain that openly and 
honestly exploring doubt about religion is beneficial because it 
ultimately leads to a deeper and more mature religious faith. 
Id. (citations omitted).  “[T]he notion that grappling with uncertainty or ambiguity is a 
positive force for personal advancement may be found in a number of the classic works on 
human development. . . .  [I]mages of the positive effects of doubt may be found in 
Erikson’s discussion of the final stage of adult development . . . .”  Krause et al., Aging, 
supra note 87, at 527 (citation omitted). 
130 See Krause & Wulff, supra note 44, at 37 (“More recent support for the notion that 
doubt may be beneficial is found in the work of developmental psychologists, who 
maintain that growth and cognitive development are driven by doubt and uncertainty.” 
(citation omitted)); Morgan, supra note 97, at 12 (“In Maslow’s study of personality 
development he reported that nonbelief seemed to be correlated with the highest levels of 
development.  Sociologists also support this positive view of nonbelievers:  the highest 
levels of happiness are reported among the most secular nations.” (citations omitted)). 
131 See Keith J. Edwards et al., The Multidimensional Structure of the Quest Construct, 39 J. OF 
PSYCHOL. & THEOLOGY 87, 88 (2011) (“[Q]uest scores correlated significantly with 
important social variables such as principled moral reasoning, lower levels of racial and 
sexual prejudice, and higher levels of helping behavior.” (citation omitted)). 
132 See Tiago Baltazar & Ron Coffen, The Role of Doubt in Religious Identity, Development, 
and Psychological Maturity, 20 J. OF RES. ON CHRISTIAN EDUC. 182, 183–84 (2011) (“[I]dentity 
achievement refers to the state of a person who has both experienced crisis and achieved 
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These findings warrant attaching an asterisk to the thesis of this paper, 
but they by no means discredit it.  This analysis has sought to illuminate 
the influence of epistemological certainty on happiness rather than to 
assess whether, all things considered, we ought to preserve 
epistemological certainty—and the weight of the evidence suggests that, 
while religious struggle may aid personal maturation, it does not breed 
happiness.133 
B. Religion as Quest 
Psychologists have operationalized Tillich’s struggle-as-growth 
concept with the “religion-as-quest” construct, a measure of the extent to 
which one conceives of religion as an internal spiritual journey, a 
striving toward truth and understanding.134  Such an orientation 
coincides with various benefits—enhanced compassion, greater facility 
in social settings, amplified curiosity and zest for intellectual pursuits.135  
But the bulk of the evidence suggests that “quest orientation” does not 
foster happiness; to the contrary, it correlates with anxiety, depression, 
and negative affect.136  It appears that the thirst for truth and self-
                                                                                                             
commitment based on the individual’s own choosing. . . .  Achieved people exhibit lower 
levels of anxiety and higher levels of self-esteem.”).  “Research concerning religious 
identity development shows that doubt is a catalyst for identity achievement. . . . [D]oubt 
increases higher-order executive processes [] to attain a self-drive for an individual who 
has a solid knowledge basis and can commit to certain religious principles.”  Id. at 187–88 
(citations omitted). 
133 See Krause & Wulff, supra note 44, at 38 (“But just because doubt may lead to insight, 
growth, and development, does not necessarily mean that it comes without a price.  In fact, 
there are at least four reasons why the ‘dark nights of the soul’ that arise from wrestling 
with doubt may be a source of significant distress.”).  Studies suggest “strong, church-
based, social ties are associated with better health.  But if individuals begin to question 
their faith, conflict may arise with church members who still adhere closely to their 
beliefs. . . .  [Further,] rejecting beliefs that have been endorsed previously may lead to 
feelings of guilt and shame.”  Id. (citations omitted).  “Although most work on religion and 
health has focused on the positive effects on health, there is now evidence that certain 
facets of religious engagement—termed ‘spiritual struggles’—can be detrimental to health 
and well-being, leading to depression and anxiety.”  Id. (citations omitted). 
134 See Keith A. Puffer, Social Personality Traits as Salient Predictors of Religious Doubt 
Phenomena Among Undergraduates, 41 J. PSYCHOL. & THEOLOGY 229, 229 (2013) (describing 
the elements of a “religion-as-quest” orientation). 
135 See id. at 231 (“[S]tudies have revealed QRO as being positively associated with social 
justice actions among African-Americans, racial openness, responsible sexual behavior, and 
an unselfish love style.” (citations omitted)). “[The] results reveal adept social intelligence 
and assertive leadership as predictive of ‘openness, curiosity, and effort,’ qualities of 
individuals engaged in ‘a continual search for more light on religious questions.’”  Id. at 
236 (citations omitted). 
136 See id. at 231 (“Regarding intrapersonal functioning, quest religiosity positively related 
to mental health concerns such as worry and stomach pain, identity distress, and personal 
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knowledge, so assiduously cultivated by our institutions of higher 
learning, comes at the price of psychic tranquility.137 
Nonetheless, many religious adherents manage to integrate struggle 
and doubt into strong, vibrant faiths.  Theirs is a sophisticated, mature 
religion, the sort Tillich exalts as the quintessence of genuine faith.  But 
the composition of this group is revealing.  The well-educated and 
financially secure excel at this melding of faith and doubt, while the less 
fortunate languish in a disorienting limbo.138  Is epistemological doubt a 
luxury of the well-off?139  Does it exact a peculiarly heavy toll on the 
most vulnerable among us? 
                                                                                                             
distress.  QRO also negatively associated to positive affect, satisfaction with life, and 
overall college adjustment.” (citations omitted)). 
137 See Krause et al., Aging, supra note 87, at 532 (considering the possibility that spiritual 
struggles sap one’s energy).  These scholars suggest: 
[T]he attainment of wisdom may not come with ease and even though 
working through doubts and ambiguities eventually reduces negative 
psychological states, these gains may also incur certain costs.  It is 
interesting to note that two of the four items in our positive affect scale 
deal with having pep and energy.  Perhaps grappling with doubt 
reduces feelings of depression, but extracts a price at the same time by 
draining psychic energies. 
Id.  “Although anxiety, depression, and religious disinterest associate with quest religiosity, 
social savvy predicted QRO.  Put simply, questers can possess mature social personality 
features—a social sophistication.  Empathy [] empowers them to communicate efficiently, 
to discern the thoughts of others, and to feel affective reactions of others.”  Puffer, supra 
note 134, at 235 (citations omitted); see, e.g., Ronald C. Jones, The Instructor’s Challenge:  
Moving Students Beyond Opinions to Critical Thinking, FACULTY FOCUS (July 29, 2013), 
available at http://www.facultyfocus.com/articles/effective-teaching-strategies/the-
instructors-challenge-moving-students-beyond-opinions-to-critical-thinking/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/7B7D-7VTS (arguing that teachers must challenge their students’ views 
and push them to think critically). 
138 See Krause, Religious Doubt and Psychological Well-Being, supra note 52, at 97 (“And the 
resources that are at an individual’s disposal should play a major role in shaping how 
doubt is handled.”).  Krause elaborates: 
[E]ducation is one such resource. . . .  Because education develops the 
ability to gather and interpret information and to solve problems on 
many levels, it increases control over events and outcomes in 
life. . . .  In contrast to those with a good education, older people with 
less schooling are likely to lack the skills needed to grapple with and 
resolve doubt. . . .  [R]epeated episodes of unsuccessful encounters 
with [doubt] are likely to spark negative emotions, such as feelings of 
frustration, confusion, and bewilderment. . . .  This may ultimately lead 
some older people to feel they are unable to control core aspects of 
their lives.  This is important because research done in secular settings 
has shown that diminished feelings of self-esteem and personal control 
are associated with greater psychological distress. 
Id. at 97–98 (citations omitted). 
139 See Schwadel, supra note 6, at 179 (“[H]ighly educated Americans often disassociate 
from organized religion and instead rely on alternative meaning systems provided by 
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VI.  PROTECTING THE VULNERABLE:  RELIGION AS PALLIATIVE 
The thesis of this analysis—that epistemological certainty underpins 
the religion-happiness connection—is subject to the caveat that such 
certainty must buoy and uplift the individual.  An unwavering 
conviction that God takes painful vengeance on the wayward tends not 
to confer happiness, however convinced one might be of its rectitude.  
Belief in a vindictive or capricious God correlates with depression, 
anxiety, guilt, and negative affect.140  Such an effect is far closer to 
Freud’s bleak conception of religion than to the contemporary view of 
religion as salutary.  It is not enough that one believe resolutely—one 
must believe correctly.141 
This poses a particularly formidable challenge for the poor and 
uneducated, whose surrounding environments plunge their 
epistemologies into disarray.142  Their conditions bring an onslaught of 
uncomfortable stimuli and contradictions—why such poverty and 
squalor when some live in abundance?  Why does misfortune befall the 
worthy and unworthy alike?  How can God abide such a state of 
affairs?143 
                                                                                                             
science.”); see also Diener et al., supra note 29, at 1278 (“[P]eople in the wealthiest nations 
tend to be leaving organized religion or have no specific religious affiliation.  This exiting 
from organized religion is most pronounced in Northern Europe and in many other highly 
economically developed nations.” (citation omitted)). 
140 See Weber et al., supra note 34, at 73 (“Negative religious coping (i.e., a punishing God, 
demonic reprisals) is associated with lower quality of life and increased depression” 
(citations omitted)). 
141 See Gawronski, supra note 108, at 659 (examining the effect on well-being of 
consistency in one’s convictions).  Gawronski argues that: 
[C]onsistency is not a motivational force in itself, but the accidental 
outcome of epistemic processes that aim at validating propositions that 
are desired and invalidating propositions that are 
undesired . . . .  Specifically, consistency should elicit positive feelings 
when it validates a desired belief, . . . negative feelings when it 
invalidates a desired belief, but positive feelings when it invalidates an 
undesired belief. . . .  [An] illustrative example is the tendency to 
justify the current social order even if the status quo goes against one’s 
personal interests.  A common finding in the literature on system 
justification is that the members of disadvantaged groups often adopt 
a negative stereotypical view of their in-group, thereby protecting their 
beliefs about the fairness of the current social structure. 
Id. at 659, 661 (citations omitted). 
142 See Diener et al., supra note 29, at 1279 (“[W]hen people face problems that push them 
to their limits . . . religion offers a number of aids:   spiritual support, ultimate explanation, 
a sense of larger, benevolent, forces at work in the universe, and a purpose in life that holds 
sacred significance.” (citations omitted)). 
143 See Krause et al., Aging, supra note 87, at 526 (“[I]t may be difficult for a person to 
believe in a loving and protecting God while at the same time recognizing that there is a 
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To quiet these nagging questions, the poor and uneducated turn 
disproportionately to religion.144  Though here a note is in order on the 
complex relationship between strength of conviction and external cues to 
doubt, a subject addressed earlier.145  If external cues to doubt undermine 
epistemological certainty, we would expect the disquieting 
contradictions that confront the poor to dampen faith.  Instead, the 
poor’s travails engender a more steadfast religiosity.146  Here, it is worth 
reviving the subject of cognitive dissonance.147  Such dissonance can 
enervate systems of meaning and belief, casting them into a perpetual 
limbo between faith and doubt.  But it might also force a retrenchment, 
as the believer cleaves ever more tightly to her beleaguered faith.148  
                                                                                                             
great deal of suffering, pain, and injustice in the world.”).  “[T]he presence of pain, evil, 
and suffering in the world serves to tax the faith of some individuals significantly.”  Id. at 
525 (citation omitted). 
144 See Diener et al., supra note 29, at 1278 (“[D]eclines in religiosity are associated with 
economic growth.”).  Some scholars maintain that: 
When people are frequently faced with hunger, illness, crime, and 
poor education—all of which are relatively more uncontrollable and 
more prevalent in poor societies—religion can perhaps make a greater 
contribution to well-being. . . .  [T]he correlations between difficult 
circumstances and religiosity are associated at the individual level [] 
and country level [], suggesting that difficult circumstances lead to 
greater religiosity.  This trend was consistent with that found in the 
U.S. data and reveals the strong tendency for nations with worse living 
circumstances to be more religious and for nations with relatively 
better conditions to be less religious. 
Id. at 1278, 1284.  Hayward and Elliott elaborate: 
[T]here is evidence that religious factors tend to have the biggest 
positive impact on well-being within otherwise disadvantaged 
demographic groups.  Krause (1998) found that religiosity was 
associated with reduced mortality only for older adults with low levels 
of education.  Banthia, Moskowitz, and Folkman (2007) found the same 
effect for low education in the relationship between frequency of 
prayer and self-reported health.  This effect may indicate that religion 
buffers negative effects suffered disproportionately by individuals 
with lower socio-economic status.  Or it may be linked with the notion 
of ‘intellectual religion’ that highly educated people tend to be less 
likely to derive a sense of existential certainty from their religious 
beliefs. 
Hayward & Elliott, supra note 32, at 593 (citation omitted).  “[R]eligiousness is often 
inversely related to education level and income (because the poor, lacking other resources 
to fall back on, often turn to religion).”  KOENIG ET AL., supra note 57, at 226. 
145 See supra Part IV (contending that the religion-happiness nexus can be traced both to 
the effect of epistemological certainty and of conformity with social norms). 
146 See KOENIG ET AL., supra note 57, at 226 (examining the relationship between religion 
and socio-economic status). 
147 See supra Part II.C (connecting epistemological doubt with cognitive dissonance). 
148 See Burns, supra note 12, at 4 (“In some instances, [] cognitive dissonance can actually 
intensify original attitudes.” (citation omitted)); Burris et al., supra note 46, at 19 (“Based on 
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Where the stakes are high enough—as they are for the poor and 
uneducated, whose epistemological order is most in jeopardy—the will 
to believe can overpower dissonant cues.149  The believer might fortify 
her epistemological armor to compensate for cracks.  In this same vein, 
the chronically infirm tend to seek refuge in religion.150  A vivisection of 
one’s epistemology in such circumstances—the kind that Tillich and his 
ilk envision—risks grave consequences for the psychological well-being 
of the most vulnerable among us. 
To ask the poor and uneducated to dissect their epistemologies is to 
ask too much at best and to imperil a critical palliative at worst.151  Thus, 
the comfortable and well-educated are more adept at marrying faith and 
                                                                                                             
Festinger, Riecken, and Schachter’s field observations of increased religious fervor among 
members of an apocalyptic religious group following a predicted cataclysm that failed to 
transpire, this paradigm assumes that cognitive dissonance can occur when a cherished 
belief is disconfirmed, leading to the use of dissonance-reducing strategies such as belief 
intensification.” (citations omitted)). 
149 See Burns, supra note 12, at 3 (“[T]he more important the concepts challenged the 
greater the dissonance; the greater the dissonance, the more intense will be the need to 
reduce it.”). 
150 See Krause, Religious Doubt and Psychological Well-Being, supra note 52, at 98 (“[A]n 
important function of religion is to allay these concerns by assuring the presence of God 
during this difficult time and reinforcing belief in continued existence after death.  But 
elders struggling with religious doubt are less likely to avail themselves of . . . an important 
way of coping with anxiety about death.”). 
151 See id. at 105–06 (stating that data consistently suggest that “older people with more 
education are less likely to suffer from the deleterious effects of doubt than older adults 
with fewer years of schooling”).  Krause further states: 
The data consistently provide support for this view across three 
different indicators of psychological well-being:  life satisfaction, self-
esteem, and optimism. . . .  [C]ompared to older people with high 
education, older adults with less education are more likely to feel that 
having doubts about religion is wrong; they are more likely to try to 
deny or repress doubts when they arise; and they are less likely to 
forgive themselves when they encounter doubts about their faith. 
Id. at 106.  Other scholars have stated: 
[A]lthough individuals living in nations with highly difficult 
circumstances generally have lower [subjective well-being], religious 
individuals had higher positive affect and lower negative affect 
compared with nonreligious individuals.  In good circumstances, 
nonreligious individuals, compared with religious individuals, had 
slightly higher life evaluations, slightly lower positive affect, and lower 
negative affect.  In such circumstances, nonreligious individuals 
generally had equal or better [subjective well-being] compared with 
religious individuals. 
Diener et al., supra note 29, at 1284.  “Individuals who experience difficulties in embracing 
religious doctrines or worldviews may be deprived of a key source of coherence and 
meaning in their lives.  This loss of a religious ‘plausibility structure,’ or orienting 
framework . . . could generate or amplify existential uncertainty.”  Ellison et al., Religious 
Doubts, supra note 31, at 131 (citation omitted). 
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doubt than are the straitened and uneducated.152  The latter also endure a 
more painful struggle when dissonance manages to penetrate their 
epistemological defenses.153  This is an intuitive finding, for stability in 
circumstances buffers against instability in the mind.  One more easily 
endures psychic tumult if one knows that at least the comforts of life are 
certain to be at hand.154 
But the stakes of epistemological certainty are only part of the 
equation here.  Tillich’s mature faith, the sort that successfully 
assimilates doubt, demands sophisticated cognitive machinery.  In F. 
Scott Fitzgerald’s memorable articulation, “[t]he test of a first rate 
intelligence is the ability to hold two ideas in the mind at the same time, 
and still retain the ability to function.”155  This machinery is not 
universal, nor does it spring full-fledged from the untrained mind.  The 
                                                 
152 See Schwadel, supra note 6, at 164–66 (considering the impact of social status).  
Schwadel explains that: 
The traditional conception of the relationship between social status 
and religion suggests that increases in education lead Americans to 
compartmentalize religion to weekend service attendance.  
Historically, this effect of education was tied to social status differences 
among religious denominations, with the middle and upper classes 
affiliating with denominations that are unlikely to stress the role of 
religion in daily life or the practice of devotional 
activities. . . .  [E]ducation should be positively related to switching to 
mainline Protestant denominations, which commonly promote beliefs 
that are in accord with scientific knowledge and worldviews, diverse 
social networks, a pluralist perspective, and other attributes associated 
with increased education. 
Id. at 164–66 (citation omitted). 
153 See Krause, Religious Doubt and Psychological Well-Being, supra note 52, at 97.  The 
author states: 
Given the lifelong influence of schooling and occupational experiences, 
people with higher levels of educational attainment are more likely to 
apply their skills in wrestling with, and resolving, religious doubt.  In 
the process, each episode of confronting and resolving doubt may 
build upon itself, promoting greater self-confidence in dealing with 
doubt, thereby removing its sting. 
Id. 
154 Diener et al., supra note 29, at 1289.  The authors elaborate: 
In societies where circumstances are more benign, the non-religious 
have superior life satisfaction, as well as less negative affect.  They also 
have greater social support and feelings of being respected. . . .  The 
nonreligious in poor societies are at the biggest disadvantage, with 
noticeably lower positive feelings and higher negative feelings, as well 
as substantial deficits in social support and respect. 
Id.; Christopher G. Ellison et al., Religious Involvement, Stress, and Mental Health:  Findings 
from the 1995 Detroit Area Study, 80 SOC. FORCES 215, 230–34 (2001) (providing data on the 
effects of social and psychological resources on health). 
155 F. Scott Fitzgerald, The Crack-Up, ESQUIRE MAG. 41 (Feb. 1936). 
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capacity to forge a coherent epistemology from disparate parts requires a 
subtle, capacious mind, the kind that tends not to flourish in poverty and 
distress.156  Where sophisticated minds may weld faith and doubt into a 
comfortable, harmonious epistemology, cognitive dissonance may drive 
less expansive minds to despair.  This insight has prompted some 
observers to argue that religion is a compensatory mechanism for the 
cognitively underdeveloped—a ready-made, comprehensive 
epistemology, with no assembly or reflection required.157 
Cognitive dissonance tends particularly to discomfit the young, 
whose minds and epistemologies undergo a dizzying maturation 
process.158  Like the poorly educated, the young lack the cognitive 
equipment necessary to assimilate doubt into their epistemologies, and 
the relative instability of their lives—a steady barrage of constitutional, 
intellectual, and circumstantial changes—compounds their inner 
struggle.159  The old and seasoned, by contrast, have the cognitive 
wherewithal to cope with epistemological struggle.160 
                                                 
156 See Puffer, supra note 134, at 236 (“Social skills such as being forceful, self-assured, 
socially poised, confident, and verbally adept appear to be necessary ‘gear’ for people who 
seek to expand their religious knowledge base.” (citation omitted)); see also Krause et al., 
Aging, supra note 87, at 526 (“[C]ollege students who had religious doubt were better able 
to differentiate among alternative dimensions to problems and were more adept at 
integrating alternative points of view.”). 
157 See Christopher G. Ellison & Jeffrey S. Levin, The Religion-Health Connection:  Evidence, 
Theory, and Future Directions, 25 HEALTH ED. & BEHAV. 700, 714–15 (1998).  The authors 
quote Pollner: 
As Pollner points out, “[r]eligious symbols and beliefs offer only one of 
many types of tools for constructing a sense of meaning and 
coherence.”  For individuals with comparatively “restricted symbolic 
codes,” however, strong “religious faith may offer an especially 
compelling framework for interpreting daily experiences and major 
life events alike.”  In effect, then, personal religious faith and/or 
practice may compensate for the lack of more sophisticated cognitive 
resources.  This possibility suggests that the effects of divine relations 
and existential certainty on well-being may be strongest among 
persons with lower levels of formal education . . .  Moreover, there is 
evidence that religious interpretations of life experiences may help to 
compensate for the dearth of more sophisticated cognitive skills 
among individuals with lower levels of formal education. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
158 See Krause, Religious Doubt and Psychological Well-Being, supra note 52, at 95 
(“[Y]ounger people are more likely than older people to experience distress when religious 
doubts arise.”). 
159 See Dein, supra note 56, at 212 (“As people grow older, religious doubts continue to be 
associated with psychopathology, but the magnitude of this association becomes weaker 
across age categories; the impact of doubt on mental distress declines as one ages.”). 
160 See Krause et al., Aging, supra note 87, at 527, 531–32 (offering supporting data).  
Scholars have stated: 
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VII.  THE U.S. SUPREME COURT’S FREE EXERCISE JURISPRUDENCE 
Thus far, this Article has outlined the psychological and sociological 
literature on the religion-happiness phenomenon and attempted to 
extract overarching insights from an occasionally desultory field of 
inquiry.  It will move now to a cursory overview of the implications of 
these insights for the U.S. Supreme Court’s free exercise jurisprudence.  
By no means do I intend an exhaustive commentary on the ramifications 
of this burgeoning area of study.  I seek only to provoke some 
preliminary reflection on those ramifications. 
Should courts and legislatures define free exercise rights expansively 
so as to afford the faithful a shield against epistemological doubt?  This 
Article has attempted to show that dissonant cues—whether behavior 
incongruous with convictions, exposure to prevalent unbelief or 
religious diversity, or the prodding of an educator to embrace self-
scrutiny—undercut epistemological certainty, enervating and even 
reversing the religion-happiness connection.161  To what extent should 
we permit religious individuals and communities to wield the law as a 
cudgel against such cues?162 
                                                                                                             
[T]he maturity and more extensive experience of those who are older 
afford a greater ability to handle doubt.  In fact, assets that accrue over 
the years may even make it possible to turn doubt into a growth 
experience . . . The data reveal that younger people may have more 
problems handling religious doubt than older individuals.  In 
particular, the noxious effects of doubt on well-being do not decline 
substantially until about age [sixty] . . .  The notion that older people 
are more adept at dealing with doubt and uncertainty is consistent 
with research on the emergence of wisdom in later life. . . .  [A]lthough 
doubt is associated with poorer mental health outcomes, our data 
suggest that older adults are able to use resources that mitigate the 
effects of doubt on depressive symptoms.  Perhaps repeated 
experience in grappling with doubt . . . inoculates elderly people from 
its noxious effects. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
161 See supra Part IV (explaining how conformity with social norms reinforces 
epistemological certainty).  Scholars have explained this theory as follows: 
[W]hen controlling for other variables, faculty support for 
spiritual/religious engagement is linked to increased religious 
skepticism. . . .  This may lead to doubts about religious truth being 
reflected through increased religious skepticism during college, an 
environment that may expose young adults to religious perspectives 
that they did not encounter in their home communities. 
Small & Bowman, supra note 86, at 166–68. 
162 See Harmer-Dionne, supra note 48, at 1300, 1312 (analyzing religious exemptions).  
One scholar contends that: 
The state should allow religious exemptions not only because freedom 
to practice one’s religion is a fundamental right, but also because a 
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The Supreme Court most famously and directly confronted this 
question in Wisconsin v. Yoder, holding that the Free Exercise Clause of 
the U.S. Constitution entitled the Amish to an exemption from 
compulsory schooling laws.163  The Court recognized the right of the 
Amish to cultivate their own, distinctive institutions, to rear their young 
apart from the modalities of the modern world.164  Yoder continued a line 
of precedent that began nine years earlier with Sherbert v. Verner.165  In 
Sherbert, the Court held that South Carolina’s denial of unemployment 
benefits to a Seventh-day Adventist who refused to work on Saturday 
violated the Free Exercise Clause.166  The Sherbert-Yoder approach 
imposed on the government the onerous burden of satisfying strict 
scrutiny—that is, of showing that the contested measure advanced a 
compelling governmental interest by narrowly tailored means—in Free 
Exercise Clause cases.167 
Although the Court did not explicitly frame its rulings as such, 
applying strict scrutiny to Free Exercise challenges signaled a victory for 
epistemological certainty.  In effect, the Court shielded the religious 
objectors in these cases from cognitive dissonance, arising either from a 
                                                                                                             
refusal to do so has detrimental effects on belief—belief being the one 
religious freedom the Supreme Court has consistently regarded as 
sacrosanct.  In Reynolds and other religion cases, federal courts have 
reiterated their commitment to freedom of belief.  If restrictions on 
religious practice actually change religious beliefs, then the Supreme 
Court must consider, more seriously than it recently has, the protection 
accorded those practices. . . .  Roger Finke and Laurence Iannaccone 
argue that religious developments mirror the changes in incentives 
and opportunities facing the producers of religion.  They chart how 
legal restrictions have ended various religious movements, such as the 
First Great Awakening in the eighteenth century, and how easing legal 
restrictions has correspondingly allowed various religious movements 
to flourish. . . .  They posit that, in the post-Smith era, the government 
may pass “any number of ‘formally neutral’ and ‘generally applicable’ 
regulations that seriously constrain the activities of specific religions” 
without regard to their detrimental effects on some religions. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
163 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972). 
164 Id. at 222–24 (“Whatever their idiosyncrasies as seen by the majority, this record 
strongly shows that the Amish community has been a highly successful social unit within 
our society, even if apart from the conventional ‘mainstream.’ . . .  There can be no 
assumption that today’s majority is ‘right’ and the Amish and others like them are 
‘wrong.’”). 
165 See generally Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 410 (1963) (examining broadly the 
Court’s decision).  For further discussion of Sherbert, see Gary C. Furst, Will the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act Be Strike Three Against Preemptory Challenges?, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 701, 
734–35 (1996). 
166 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 400–02. 
167 Id. at 403.  
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disjunction between belief and behavior (Sherbert) or from exposure to 
divergent worldviews (Yoder).168  Yoder represented a particularly stark 
clash between sheltered epistemological certainty and the prevailing 
ideals of modernity as embodied in the public educational system.169  
The former prevailed, as the Court upheld the right of religious 
minorities to stand resolutely apart from mainstream society.170 
But what the Court giveth, the Court taketh away.171  In Employment 
Division v. Smith, the Court abandoned the Sherbert-Yoder strict scrutiny 
analysis and held that neutral laws of general applicability do not violate 
the Free Exercise Clause.172  In so doing, it threw free exercise rights to 
the vicissitudes of the political process and stripped the faithful of the 
right, ratified in Yoder, to wall themselves off from mainstream society.173  
The Court’s decision sat uneasily with Congress, which attempted to 
revive the Sherbert-Yoder precedent with the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act (“RFRA”).174  But the Court substantially diluted RFRA’s 
impact when it invalidated its application to the states in City of Boerne v. 
                                                 
168 Id. at 404.  According to Festinger: 
Dissonance almost always exists after an attempt has been made, by 
offering rewards or threatening punishment, to elicit overt behavior 
that is at variance with private opinion.  If the overt behavior is 
successfully elicited, the person’s private opinion is dissonant with his 
knowledge concerning his behavior. . . . ”  [I]f forced compliance has 
caused dissonance, one may reduce the dissonance by changing her 
private opinion to accord with her overt behavior. 
Harmer-Dionne, supra note 48, at 1317 (footnotes omitted).  See generally Wisconsin v. 
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 222–24 (1972) (discussing the effects of exposure to divergent 
worldviews). 
169 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 222–24; Harmer-Dionne, supra note 48, at 1304 (discussing Wisconsin 
v. Yoder).  Harmer-Dionne explains: 
Justice Berger further suggested that forced action (and perhaps forced 
inaction) can affect religious belief.  He wrote that to apply compulsory 
education laws to the Amish would seriously endanger their religious 
beliefs by exposing their children to antithetical values.  This would 
unjustly interfere with the religious development of the children and 
their integration into the Amish community. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
170 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 222–24. 
171 See Harmer-Dionne, supra note 48, at 1299 (“Since 1972, the Supreme Court has 
rejected all claims for free exercise exemptions outside the context of unemployment 
benefits as addressed in Sherbert.” (footnote omitted)). 
172 Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878–79 (1990). 
173 See id. at 879, 890 (“It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the political 
process will place at a relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely 
engaged in; but that [is an] unavoidable consequence of democratic government . . . ”). 
174 See generally Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), Pub. L. No. 103141, 
107 Stat. 1488 (providing the federal law aimed at preventing exemptions from federal laws 
that substantially burden the free exercise of religion). 
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Flores.175  To be sure, some states have enacted RFRA analogues, and 
religious objectors can rely on state constitutional provisions to vindicate 
their free exercise rights.176  But Smith effectively removed the most 
formidable weapon in their arsenal—the U.S. Constitution. 
Would a return to Sherbert-Yoder help the faithful keep cognitive 
dissonance at bay and thereby redound to optimum happiness?  This is a 
thorny question that poses at least two major complications.  I have 
already addressed the first—that the happiness of the believer is but one 
consideration in a broader happiness equation.177  Accommodating 
religious objectors may entail substantial costs for society—or even, as 
we have seen, for the objector herself if the conduct for which she seeks 
an exemption buttresses a belief in a malevolent God.178  But the costs 
and benefits of epistemological certainty for society at large are beyond 
the objective of this analysis, which is to persuade the reader that the 
prevailing taste for self-scrutiny and internal struggle in matters 
religious may be misguided inasmuch as it detracts from individual 
happiness.  Thus, I will bracket this potential objection.  I hasten to add, 
however, that the happiness of the believer is hardly nugatory.  To the 
contrary, it is a meaningful part of the larger happiness calculus. 
The second complication is subtler—might expanded free exercise 
rights promote religious diversity and thus add to the dissonant cues 
that weaken or reverse the religion-happiness nexus?179  Might a 
religious monolith, a single Truth that swallows all competing truths, 
redound to maximal happiness?  The government could promote such a 
hegemon one of two ways.  First, it could directly support the one Truth 
and muscle out its competitors.  There is some empirical evidence that 
such a posture promotes happiness.  Indeed, government support of 
religion correlates positively with intrinsic religiosity—for just as we 
would expect dissonant cues to dampen genuine belief, so too would we 
expect reinforcing cues to magnify it.180  In the United States, however, 
                                                 
175 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 507–09 (1997). 
176 See Sara Lunsford Kohen, Religious Freedom in Private Lawsuits:  Untangling When RFRA 
Applies to Suits Involving Only Private Parties, 10 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 43, 80 
n.262 (2011) (“Fourteen states have [adopted] state RFRAs, which are similar to the federal 
RFRA, but apply to state law [analogues].”). 
177 See supra Part V (explaining that individual happiness is only one variable in the 
larger happiness calculus). 
178 See supra Part VI (discussing how religion serves as a palliative for the poor and 
uneducated). 
179 See supra Part IV (explaining how dissonant cues in the external world undermine 
religion’s salutary effect on happiness). 
180 See Elliott & Hayward, supra note 82, at 302 (“[T]he association between personal 
religious identity and psychological well-being increases as restrictions on overall freedom 
increase.”). 
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the Establishment Clause prevents such an embrace of religion.181  
Alternatively, the government could simply withdraw and permit 
majoritarian rule to operate unchecked, empowering religious majorities 
to cement their dominance through the political process.  Put differently, 
it could do precisely what the Supreme Court did in Smith.182  If Smith 
facilitates the emergence of a religious monolith, might we not applaud 
it?183 
My only response to this concededly compelling objection is that a 
faith comprised solely of those values and principles that command a 
consensus would be substantially neutered.  It would in all likelihood 
devolve into the sort of extrinsic religiosity that we have seen correlates 
inversely with happiness.184  Like the elastic faith of mainstream 
denominations, it would be a constellation of more or less universal 
values, a worldview with too many lacunas to provide the comfort and 
stability of epistemological certainty.185  Again, a universalist faith does 
not necessarily entail epistemological doubt—though the data tend to 
support the natural supposition that the two coincide.186  It is sufficient 
to reiterate that mainline Protestants and Catholics—whose values 
would assumedly prevail in a hegemonic arrangement—appear to be 
less happy than believers on the margins of the religious landscape.187  
Optimal happiness may demand insulating those marginal groups from 
dissonant cues rather than converting them into discontented 
Presbyterians.188 
                                                 
181 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
182 See Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878 (1990) (holding 
that generally applicable, neutral laws do not violate the Free Exercise Clause). 
183 See Small & Bowman, supra note 86, at 168 (“Members of religious minority groups 
often experience the privileging of Christianity and therefore may perceive a contradiction 
inherent within the existence of multiple religious ideologies (minimally, their own and 
that of Christians).” (citation omitted)). 
184 See supra Part III.A (explaining the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic 
religiosity and their different effects on happiness). 
185 See supra Part III.B (explaining the capacity of religious certainty to confer a feeling of 
safety and security). 
186 See generally PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUBLIC LIFE, supra note 86 (detailing statistics 
on religion in America and exploring the shifts taking place in the American religious 
landscape). 
187 See supra Part III.B (noting that adherents of marginal faiths tend to be happier than 
those of mainstream faiths). 
188 See Harmer-Dionne, supra note 48, at 1310 (examining the response of the mainstream 
to marginal religious movements).  According to Harmer-Dionne: 
A marginal religious movement (‘MRM’) is one which challenges the 
social and theological norms of the dominant culture to such a degree 
that the dominant culture feels compelled to marginalize and sanction 
it, often with startling severity.  In the face of mainstream opposition, 
MRMs tend to follow one of two paths.  On the first path, they may 
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VIII.  CONCLUSION 
The unexamined life is not worth living.  So goes the venerable 
Socratic maxim, endorsed with gusto by enlightened, inquiring minds.  
Should we embrace doubt and eschew the comforts of certainty—of an 
orderly and stable moral, intellectual, and spiritual universe?  Are we 
better off in the shelter of dogmatism than in the crucible of doubt? 
Should courts and legislatures cordon off a space within which the 
faithful may shield themselves from cognitive dissonance?  The religion-
happiness literature illuminates these vital questions and suggests that 
even skepticism itself ought not to escape the searching gaze of inquiring 
minds. 
  
                                                                                                             
continue to defy the dominant culture, in which case they remain in 
small enclaves and face continued persecution, often leading to 
obliteration.  If MRMs follow the second path, they eventually 
capitulate to mainstream pressure and incorporate dominant norms to 
a sufficient degree to survive as viable entities. 
Id. 
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